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DEFERRAL AND THE DISSIDENT
Paul Alan Levy*
Resolving unfair labor practice claims fairly and efficiently
is one of the most important functions of national labor
relations policy. Providing effective redress for these claims
is significant not only for individual employees but also for the
health of union democracy. Unfortunately, the process of
resolving these claims has become highly politicized and in
many cases has been used to squelch union dissident move-
ments. As a result, entrenched union officials can and often
do ignore the interests of their members.
Employees are protected under the National Labor Relations
Act' (NLRA or the Act) from certain forms of discrimination
by employers. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA2 forbids employers
from engaging in any discriminatory conduct used to discour-
age union membership. Section 8(a)(1) 3 forbids employers
from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection. If an employee believes that her
employer has violated one of these sections, she can initiate
unfair labor practice (ULP) proceedings under the NLRA.4
Where the employee's union and employer have entered into
a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) under which the
employee's claim could arguably be brought, however, the
employer may assert the employee's failure to exhaust her
remedies under the CBA as a defense to her ULP claim.
Under current law, the General Counsel of the National Labor
* B.A., Reed College, 1973; J.D., University of Chicago, 1976. The author is
an attorney at the Public Citizen Litigation Group. He has represented Teamsters
for a Democratic Union, many of its members, and other union members in numerous
cases in which the principal issue, at least at the appellate level, was whether the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or some other adjudicatory body should defer
to arbitration. A number of his cases also have presented the question of whether
Teamster joint committees should be treated as arbitrators in the application of
various labor law doctrines.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
2. Id. § 158(a)(3).
3. Id. § 158(a)(1).
4. Under the NLRA, she may file a charge with the General Counsel (the head
of the prosecutorial branch of the NLRB), who will decide whether to issue a com-
plaint for adjudication by the Board or one of its agents, e.g., an administrative law
judge (A1,J). Id. § 160(b)-(c) (1988).
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Relations Board (NLRB) has the discretion to honor this
defense and refuse to process a ULP claim until the employee
exhausts her remedies-usually arbitration-under the CBA.5
Furthermore, if an employee does take her claim to arbitration
and loses, the NLRB can defer to the arbitrator's decision if
certain conditions are met.6
Deferral to the internal remedial processes of CBAs,
however, in certain circumstances undermines union democra-
cy by allowing employers and entrenched union officials to
discriminate against union dissidents. To illustrate this
argument, I discuss two examples involving a dissident group,
Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU), that vividly
illustrate the problems with NLRB deferral. I then examine
the development and evolution of the NLRB's policies concern-
ing deferral to arbitration. Next, I review the statutory- and
policy-based arguments advanced for and against deferral. I
attempt to assess the best reasons given for the deferral
doctrine, while showing why, at least in its current incar-
nation, NLRB deferral doctrine is contrary to the requirements
of the NLRA. More specifically, I show that, to the extent that
deferral has some legitimate basis, it is founded on assump-
tions that cannot readily be applied to some grievance proce-
dures, particularly the Teamster joint committee process.7
Finally, I examine the joint committees in detail and explain
why the NLRB has erred in extending deferral doctrine to the
proceedings and decisions of these bodies.
I. INTRODUCTION: TWO PARADIGMATIC CASES
Rod Howard is an employee of United Parcel Service (UPS)
at its terminal in Knoxville, Tennessee. He is a shop steward
for Teamsters Local 519, which represents UPS's Knoxville
employees in collective bargaining' (as the Teamsters union
represents UPS employees generally throughout the country).
5. See Local Union No. 2188, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d
1087, 1090 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Transcript at 50-51, United Parcel Serv., Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (No. 10-
CA-23981) (Aug. 27, 1991).
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Howard is also an active member of TDU, a national organiza-
tion of Teamster members who seek both to reform and
democratize their union and to increase its militancy and
effectiveness in representing members' interests vis-ei-vis
employers such as UPS.9
TDU members who work for UPS often criticize the union
for its handling of grievances and other problems that arise
during the term of the CBA with UPS.' ° Moreover, each time
the CBA has come up for renegotiation, TDU members
employed by UPS have pointed out deficiencies in the propos-
als negotiated by the Teamster leadership with UPS and have
urged the rejection of such proposals until certain improve-
ments are incorporated." In addition to directing campaigns
at the negotiation and administration of particular CBAs,
TDU also has played a major role-the major role-in foster-
ing intraunion debate over the character of union finances and
union leadership by publishing exposes of fiscal scandals
within the union and supporting insurgent candidates for
election to union offices at both the local and national lev-
els.' 2 Needless to say, TDU and its members are not beloved
among the hierarchy of either UPS or the Teamsters union. 3
Because Howard and many other UPS employees spend
their days driving trucks, either from one urban center to
another or picking up and delivering customers' packages,
they find it inconvenient to communicate with each other
9. Id.
10. TDU's monthly publication, the Convoy Dispatch, often carries at least one
tabloid sized page of news related to UPS. See, e.g., We Are the Majority, CONVOY
DISPATCH, Oct. 1987, at 1; UPS Contract Ignores Concerns, Represents Broken
Promises, CONVOY DISPATCH, Aug. 1987, at 9; Selkman, UPSers: Take Honest Look
at Givebacks, CONVOY DISPATCH, June/July 1987, at 9.
11. See Bauman v. Presser, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2393,2394 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal
dismissed, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2247 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Bauman contains a lengthy
discussion of TDU's campaign efforts in connection with UPS contract ratification
referenda. 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2394, 2397-98, 2399; see also Levy, Membership
Rights in Union Referenda to Ratify Collective Bargaining Agreements, 4 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 225, 235-67 (1987).
12. See, e.g., Theodus v. McLaughlin, 852 F.2d 1380, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Camarata v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 478 F. Supp. 321,328-29 (D.D.C. 1979),
aff'd mem., 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2924 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Reports Show Over $1 Million
Was Spent on Las Vegas Parties, CONVOY DISPATCH, Aug. 1987, at 1; Your Dues Pay
for Thi$?, CONVOY DISPATCH, June/July 1987, at 10.
13. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED
CRIME, BUSINESS AND LABOR UNIONS 114-18 (1986) (describing union-organized
assaults on TDU meetings); Teamster Leaders Want You to Know Why UPS Ballot
Cost Twice as Much as it Should Have, INT'L TEAMSTER, Nov. 1984, at 16-18 (denoun-
cing TDU for its role in blocking ratification of UPS contract).
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about work-related issues during the work day. To communi-
cate with the membership about union issues that he and
TDU sought to raise, Howard customarily posted TDU leaflets
on a bulletin board at UPS's Knoxville terminal. 14 According
to Howard, UPS has made numerous efforts to prevent
Howard from using this inexpensive but effective means of
communication, first by tearing down TDU literature when-
ever it was posted on the bulletin board, and later by "coinci-
dentally" removing the bulletin board in the course of moving
and reorganizing the UPS facility. 5
The NLRA forbids employers from discriminating against
union members who seek to communicate with each other
about work or union issues. Such communications are deemed
a form of union membership activity 6 under section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA,"7 which expressly proscribes discriminatory
conduct used to discourage union membership, including
membership activities." Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA also
protects employees in this circumstance: it forbids employers
from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection.' 9 Intermember communications
are an obvious form of such concerted activity.2 °
The NLRB has developed an intricate set of rules concerning
the extent to which employees' and nonemployees' attempts to
communicate with each other at the workplace are protected
by these two subsections of the statute, balancing employees'
rights under these provisions against employers' property
rights and interest in conducting efficient operations. 2'
14. Transcript at 51-52, United Parcel Serv., Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (No. 10-
CA-23981) (Aug. 27, 1991).
15. Id. 62-66, 104, 144-45.
16. See Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 331, 340-41 (1979) (ALJ
decision); see also Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42 (1954) (stating
that term "membership" in section 8(a)(3) includes not just the right to join, but also
the right to be "good, bad or indifferent members"); NLRB v. Milk Drivers and Dairy
Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1165 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that "membership"
includes right to participate in union activities).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
18. See Radio Officers' Union, 347 U.S. at 39-40.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
20. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1975);
Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964); East Tex. Motor
Freight, 262 N.L.R.B. 868, 868-69 (1982).
21. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 109-10 (1956); Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.8 (1945); 1 NATIONAL LABOR COMM.,
NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, EMPLOYEE & UNION MEMBER GUIDE TO LABOR LAw §§ 1.08-.09,
at 1-66 to 1-95 (R. Gibbs & P. Levy eds. 1991).
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Briefly stated, these provisions do not give employers any in-
dependent obligation to provide a bulletin board for dissidents
to post literature where it will be seen easily by the employees
and will not be removed with the daily trash.22 If, however,
an employer does allow employees to post communications on
a bulletin board (such as "for sale" signs and notices of
picnics), then it becomes a "general purpose" bulletin board
and the employer may not discriminate against messages
reflecting concerted activity by taking down only the political
items.23 Moreover, an employer may not remove an existing
bulletin board to make it more difficult for protected communi-
cations to be disseminated to its employees.24
Howard thus had a claim that UPS had committed a ULP by
trying to prevent him from disseminating TDU literature
through the censorship, and then the removal, of the general
purpose bulletin board at the Knoxville terminal. But when
he filed a charge to that effect with the NLRB, UPS raised as
a defense that Howard had another way to pursue any
legitimate claim about the bulletin board-by asserting his
rights under the CBA between the Teamsters and UPS. In
theory, that avenue would indeed be promising, for two
reasons. First, if UPS had established a past practice of
making a bulletin board available for employee postings,
Howard could argue that the past practice had become part of
the CBA and that UPS violated the past practice by removing
the bulletin board in the process of its reorganization.25
Arguably, the removal would violate the CBA even if UPS's
motives were entirely pure. Theoretically, the contractual
claim was stronger than the NLRB charge which depended on
a finding of improper motivation. Second, the CBA generally
22. See Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1983).
23. See NLRB v. Honeywell, Inc., 722 F.2d 405, 406-07 (8th Cir. 1983). The
courts of appeals have carved out an exception that allows employers to give space
to the United Way without making the bulletin board a general purpose one. See
Serv-Air, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 557, 560-61 (10th Cir. 1968).
24. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 831 F.2d 1285, 1290 (6th Cir. 1987).
25. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 389-411
(3d ed. 1973) (discussing how custom and past practice may be found to create
enforceable rights). The contract between the Teamsters and UPS generally
maintains the standards concerning the conditions of employment as they exist at the
time of the signing of the agreement, unless they are contradicted by the agreement.
See UNITED PARCEL SERV., SOUTHERN CONFERENCE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
art. 47 (Aug. 1, 1987-July 31, 1990) [hereinafter SOUTHERN SUPPLEMENT]; NATIONAL
MASTER FREIGHT AGREEMENT art. 6, § 1 (Apr. 1, 1985-Mar. 31, 1988) [hereinafter
NMFA].
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forbids discrimination prohibited by law, and specifically
forbids discrimination based on union activities.26 In short,
UPS argued that Howard had powerful weapons in his
contractual arsenal, if he would but use them, and that the
NLRB should not concern itself with Howard's complaints
until he had first tried to enforce his contractual rights.
Although employees sometimes may sue to enforce their
rights under a CBA,27 Howard could not sue to force UPS to
comply with those contractual rights that were parallel to his
rights under the NLRA. Rather, one who seeks to enforce a
CBA must first exhaust the enforcement procedures specified
by the CBA. 2' Typically, this procedure begins with a series
of "grievance meetings" between representatives of the
employer and the union and, in most unions, culminates in a
hearing before an impartial arbitrator selected by the parties
to interpret and apply the CBA when the parties are unable
to agree about how to resolve a particular dispute under the
CBA.29 Indeed, once those procedures are exhausted, the
outcome of the grievance procedure is, with a small group of
exceptions, final and binding on the parties to the agree-
ment.3" These strictures apply equally to employees, employ-
ers, and unions.31 Employees also may seek to enforce the
CBA directly against the employer if they can prove that,
because the union breached its duty of fair representation
(DFR),32 they should be excused from either the duty to
exhaust their remedies under a CBA or from the final and
binding character of a disposition of their grievance.33
To exhaust his contractual remedies as UPS demanded,
Howard would have been required to persuade his union to
26. NATIONAL MASTER UNITED PARCEL SERVICE AGREEMENT art. 36 (Aug. 1,
1987-July 31, 1990).
27. Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 111 S. Ct. 498, 501-02
(1990); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962).
28. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
29. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 25, at 120-22.
30. See, e.g., General Drivers, Local Union No. 89 v. Riss & Co., Inc., 372 U.S.
517, 519 (1963) (per curiam); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1960).
31. See, e.g., Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery & Confectionery
Workers Int'l, 370 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1962); United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, Local 1119 v. United Markets, Inc., 784 F.2d 1413, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986).
32. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944); Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944).
33. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976); see
also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
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exercise its authority under the CBA to file a grievance and to
advocate his position before the arbitral body provided by the
CBA. Howard was reluctant to do this for several reasons.
First, he would have had to persuade the head of his local
union to file the grievance, an individual who was hostile to
TDU and who stated that he did not want to take the griev-
ance to the panel because it was a "TDU grievance."34
Second, and far more important, for reasons that will be
discussed in more detail later, the UPS agreement, like most
major Teamster contracts, creates a decisional body called a
"joint grievance panel" or "joint grievance committee," that
consists of an equal number of union and UPS representatives,
and authorizes it to make final and binding decisions on
grievances.35 Given this structure, even if Howard could
have persuaded his union leader to file the grievance, and
even if the leader had presented it fairly to the joint commit-
tee, the ultimate decision on the grievance would rest with
union appointees who also were likely to be hostile to TDU.36
Thus, Howard regarded deferral of his charge pending its
presentation to a grievance panel as at best a futile act delaying
the enforcement of his free speech rights under the NLRA.37
But even worse, he was concerned that once the grievance
committee had been given a chance to rule on his claim, UPS
would argue, and the NLRB might agree, that the NLRB should
accept the grievance panel's judgment as conclusive.
Howard, however, had no choice but to submit his contrac-
tual claim to the union grievance procedure. The General
Counsel of the NLRB decided to honor UPS's deferral defense
by refusing to process his charge further until Howard had
34. Telephone interview with Ellen Hampton, NLRB attorney (Mar. 1990). The
union president made this comment to Ms. Hampton. The evidence was not
introduced at trial, however, to avoid putting her on the stand.
35. SOUTHERN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 25, art. 43(c).
36. One can assume that UPS's committee representatives would have voted to
uphold their colleague who had removed the bulletin board.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). The section 7 right to engage in concerted activities
for mutual protection includes the right to communicate with other employees about
matters of collective concern, such as intraunion affairs. See, e.g., Helton v. NLRB,
656 F.2d 883, 887 & n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Although the union may waive section 7
rights in collective bargaining if the waiver is "clear and unmistakable," Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983), the union generally may not waive the
right to communicate about union affairs. See General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 512
F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1975); Universal Fuels, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. No. 31, slip op. at
8-9, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1060, 1062-63 (Apr. 19, 1990).
38. See, e.g., Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984). This decision is discussed
in greater depth infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
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given the grievance panel a chance to consider his contention.
Because the General Counsel has virtually unreviewable
discretion to decide whether or not to file a ULP complaint
and bring the case to trial,39 Howard was faced with a
Hobson's choice: either allow the grievance to be heard by his
union adversaries or face the NLRB's refusal to consider his
claim.40
The joint grievance panel heard Howard's case, and not
surprisingly, the panel decided that the CBA had not been
violated.41 Again, as expected, UPS argued that the Board
should defer to arbitration, and now argued that the grievance
committee's decision should be accepted as a final decision on
the ULP issue. The General Counsel, however, rejected this
deferral argument for two reasons. First, the local union had
argued the grievance solely on the basis of UPS's past prac-
tice, but had not made the argument, which was central to the
ULP claim, that the reason for removing the bulletin board
was UPS's desire to suppress Howard's activity.42 Second,
the General Counsel was persuaded that the members of the
grievance panel had an interest adverse to Howard's grievance
because he was seeking the right to disseminate literature
that the company and the union would have preferred to
39. Generally, review in the courts of appeals may be sought only of Board
decisions on unfair labor practice charges, not of decisions of its agents. See 29
U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988). In Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), the Court discusses
situations in which judicial review is inappropriate and states that a district court
may review an order by the Board when the Board clearly has violated a statutory
right and the party has no alternative way to force the issue, such as by violating the
Board's interpretation of the statute and then resisting a consequent unfair labor
practice charge. Id. at 187-91.
40. Arguably, the Board's decision to defer might amount to a refusal to exercise
jurisdiction plainly conferred by the statute. If it were first plainly established that
the statute forbade such deferral, the General Counsel's construction of the statute
in a way that disclaimed jurisdiction would be reviewable under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1988), and a remand to the General Counsel for
reconsideration of its nonenforcement decision in light of a correct interpretation of
the Act would be warranted. Id. § 706(1); cf Montana Air Chapter No. 29, Ass'n of
Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 898 F.2d 753,757-58 (9th
Cir. 1990).
41. Answer of Respondent at 1, United Parcel Serv., Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. No. 87
(No. 10-CA-23981) (Aug. 27, 1991).
42. Ironically, the employer did not raise the argument that the failure to
present the ULP issue amounted to a failure to invoke arbitration that warranted a
remand to arbitration to consider the ULP issue. See Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1988), enforced en banc sub nom. Hammontree v. NLRB,
925 F.2d 1486, 1499-1500 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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suppress. Accordingly, the panel's decision was infected by a
conflict of interest and would not be a sound basis for refusing
to consider Howard's ULP charge.43 The Board ultimately
upheld the ALJ's finding of violation.44
The second case in which the Board insisted on deferral
involved the discharge of Adolph ("Skip") Hoffman, another
longtime dissident and TDU activist.45 Hoffman had run for
office against the leader of his union local on three separate
occasions, and had openly supported opposition candidates on
two other occasions. He had long been an organizer in his
area for TDU and its predecessor organization, PROD;46 he
had worn TDU paraphernalia and had openly distributed TDU
literature. In short, he was the prototypical open union
oppositionist. After losing his original trucking job because of
dislocations in the industry, he began working as a "casual"
employee-that is, an employee without seniority rights and
without substantial protection through the grievance proce-
dure47-for Consolidated Freightways (Consolidated). Al-
though casuals are supposed to be placed on the seniority list
if they work a minimum number of days,4" Hoffman never
43. Cf. Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 769, 788 (1979), enforced in part, 109 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2663 (9th Cir. 1981).
44. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (Aug. 27, 1991). UPS dropped
the deferral defense after I entered an appearance on behalf of Howard and subpoe-
naed documents for the announced purpose of making arguments comparable to those
contained in this article concerning the impropriety of deferring to a Teamster joint
committee decision as a matter of law. Amended Answer of Respondent at 1.
45. Consolidated Freightways Corp. (N.L.R.B. 1988) (No. 4-CA-17221).
46. The Professional Drivers Council for Safety and Health, whose name was
later shortened to fit its acronym, PROD, was founded at the behest of Ralph Nader
in 1972 by Arthur L. Fox II as a Washington, D.C.-based public interest group whose
attention was focused on truck safety issues. Over time, its emphasis shifted to
intraunion affairs, and its governance was assumed by an elected board of rank-and-
file members. S. BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS 312-20 (1978); D. LA BOTZ, RANK-AND-FILE
REBELLION 42-49 (1990). In 1979, PROD merged with TDU. Id. at 179-80.
47. NMFA, supra note 25, art. 3, § 2(B). TDU has argued repeatedly that, by
permitting employers to employ workers on a part-time or casual basis without
bringing them under the seniority protections of the CBA, the union was allowing
trucking companies to undercut the working conditions of the long-term employees
and actually encouraging companies to try to fire permanent employees and to
replace them with casual employees who receive lower pay and lesser protections.
See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact 1 40, Bauman v. Presser, 117 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2393 (D.D.C. 1984) (No. 84-2699), appeal dismissed, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2247
(D.C. Cir. 1985); D. LA BOTZ, supra note 46, at 203, 245-46.
48. See NMFA, supra note 25, art. 3, § 2; CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA OVER-THE-
ROAD AND LocAL CARTAGE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT, art. 42, § 1.
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achieved that status because, he asserts, Consolidated would
stop calling him just long enough to maintain his status as a
casual.49 When another casual employee, Barry Dantrick,
who had spent less time with the company, was added to the
seniority list,5° Hoffman filed a grievance alleging that the
reason for this promotion was Dantrick's friendship with local
union president Burns and Burns's urging of Consolidated to
give his friend a job.51 Hoffman also contended that Consoli-
dated had violated the agreement by failing to add casual
employees to the seniority list after they had worked the
proper number of days. Almost immediately after this
grievance was filed, the company stopped calling him to work
as a casual.53
Hoffman then filed a ULP charge contending that Consoli-
dated had stopped calling him in retaliation for his filing of a
grievance.54 Initially, Consolidated did not raise a deferral
defense, and after equivocating about whether Hoffman had a
meritorious case, the General Counsel ultimately filed a
complaint." At that point, however, the union indicated that
it was willing to handle Hoffman's grievance and submit his
ULP claim to the joint committee. Both the union and the
company asserted that the Board therefore should defer to the
joint committee procedure. Hoffman argued against deferral
on two grounds. First, he had a conflict with the union
officials who would represent him as advocates and as
members of the joint committee.56 Second, he argued his
claim was not the type of grievance by casuals that could be
49. Affidavit of Adolph Hoffman at 4, 8, Consolidated Freightways Corp., No.
4-CA-17221 (N.L.R.B.) (Mar. 11, 1988).
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Complaint at 1-2, Consolidated Freightways Corp., (N.L.R.B.) (Jan. 26, 1989)
No. 4-CA-17221.
55. The NLRB Regional Director dismissed the complaint on the merits, but
Hoffman persuaded the General Counsel's Office of Appeals in Washington that his
case had sufficient merit to warrant a complaint. Letter from Mary M. Shanklin to
Adolph Hoffman (Dec. 20, 1988). It is not clear why Consolidated did not argue
deferral initially. It may have had indications from the Region that the case was
going to be dismissed on the merits, and it preferred a clean resolution in that
fashion. On the other hand, Consolidated might have preferred to avoid arguing that
grievances by casuals like Hoffman could be heard by the joint committee to avoid
setting a precedent that might be used by the union to protect casuals in the future.
56. P. Levy, Oral argument preparation notes at 5 Consolidated Freightways, No.
4-CA-17221.
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heard by joint committees." In sum, Hoffman contended
that the very circumstances-in which deferral had been
raised suddenly, a few days before the hearing, with the union
and the employer uniting to urge deferral to avoid a hearing
on his ULP claim-strongly suggested that the union was not
trying to help him get his job restored but rather to stab him
in the back in the guise of a joint committee "arbitration."58
Yet the Regional Director deferred.5 9 He first decided that
in light of the union's and the company's professed willingness
to take the case through their grievance procedure, it would be
appropriate to defer to their construction of the CBA to the
extent that this type of grievance was within the grievance
committee's jurisdiction." As for the conflict of interest, the
Regional Director decided that the union should be presumed
to have an interest in supporting its members' right to file
grievances, and accordingly there was no facial conflict
between the position that the union would be urging before
the joint committee and the interests of the union or its
leadership.61 The fact that the political differences between
Hoffman and the union leadership would necessarily have
been evident from a full and fair presentation of the ULP issue
before the joint committee apparently did not faze the Board
at all.62
Hoffman presented arguments similar to those accepted by
the General Counsel in Howard's case for refusing to defer his
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Letter from Peter D. Hirsch, NLRB Regional Director, to Dennis Morikawa
and Adolph Hoffman (Oct. 16, 1989).
60. Id. at 1.
61. The Regional Director's deferral letter did not expressly address the conflict
of interest problem. The statement of his position in the text is based on my
discussion with him when I presented oral argument against deferral on Hoffman's
behalf on June 2, 1989. The Regional Director also noted that Hoffman's own
campaigns for office had been several years earlier, indicating that the conflict had
abated, despite the fact that it was conceded at oral argument that Hoffman's other
dissident activity was more recent and that Hoffman's allegation was that he had
been fired immediately after filing a grievance complaining of favoritism by the
company toward the union president's friend.
62. The General Counsel later reopened the ULP proceeding and revoked the
deferral decision on the ground that the union did not take Hoffman's grievance to
the joint committee after committing itself to prosecute his case. This development
does not, of course, detract from the argument made here about the Board's failure
to recognize the impact that deferral to the joint committee has on ULP charges filed
by union dissidents. After I entered an appearance in this case and subpoenaed docu-
ments to support an attack on deferral to the joint committee system, Consolidated
settled the case by making a large cash payment to Hoffman.
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ULP claim to the joint grievance committee's decision. The
members of the joint committee had equal institutional
hostility to TDU and would derive similar institutional
benefits from having Hoffman's grievance denied. They could
rid themselves of a pesky dissident like Hoffman and discour-
age other workers from complaining about political favoritism
and from supporting TDU in their own locals. Arguably the
difference in result could be explained by the fact that
different Board regions, and thus different decision makers,
were involved. I am inclined to doubt those explanations,
however, because the pattern of deferring ULP cases involving
the discharge of TDU activists appears in various parts of the
country and continues to this date.63
Rather, the result in Hoffman's case is best explained by the
Board's position that no conflict of interest arises in a griev-
ance concerning the discharge of a TDU member because the
union is presumed to have an interest in avoiding the unjust
discharges of all of its constituents. Thus, the Board assumes
that the union has an interest in protecting Hoffman from
discharge even though seeking to have the joint committee
directly order the company to allow the distribution of TDU
literature may give rise to a conflict of interest.
Consider, however, the effect that Board deferral to joint
grievance committees has on the prospects for democratic
opposition within the union. Stated simply, it has an unnerv-
ing impact on TDU's ability to recruit and retain adherents.
First, there is the actual impact that deferral has on the
Board's willingness to hear particular cases in which dissi-
dents claim that their employers have committed a ULP either
by prohibiting them from engaging in a certain activity or by
disciplining them for their TDU activity. Deferral in these
cases gives the employers a chance either to excise trouble-
some elements from the work force or to neutralize them by
preventing them from communicating effectively with their
colleagues.
63. The Regional Office based in Atlanta, which handled Howard's case, might
have a slightly different orientation toward deferral because the Eleventh Circuit, in
which it is located, has rejected decisively the NLRB's standard for deferral, set forth
in Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984), especially in the joint committee context.
Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891
(1989). My discussions with counsel in the Atlanta region, however, suggest that
Taylor played no role in their decision to pursue Howard's case, which arose in the
Sixth Circuit.
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But even more important is the chilling effect of the Board's
deferral policies. Despite current fashion among labor side
attorneys to talk about how useless the Board has become in
light of the promanagement appointments and antilabor deci-
sions that began with the chairmanship of Donald Dotson in
the early 1980s,6 4 workers still take comfort from the as-
sumption that, if an employer tries to punish them for
dissident activity, the government will be there to protect
them. They know better than to think that they can expect
help from union officials against whom they speak, but they
assume that the Board will prevent arrant discrimination.
The most insidious effect of Board deferral to joint grievance
committee decisions is that it tells Teamsters that only the
union can bail them out of trouble when the employer comes
after them. Because workers assume-with good reason, I
believe-that open union dissidents cannot count on union
officials to support them, and indeed that joint grievance
committees are established in part for the precise purpose of
killing their grievances,65 their knowledge of the Board's
deferral policies discourages them from becoming open
dissidents in the first place.
The Board's exception to its deferral policy, pursuant to
which TDU literature distribution cases are not deferred but
most other cases involving TDU members are, does not
eliminate this chilling effect, but rather accentuates it. It
means that where all that is at stake is an employer's instruc-
tions not to disseminate literature, the Board may hear the
case, but if a member's job is at stake, the case is likely to be
deferred.6"
64. E.g., Oversight Hearings on the Subject "Has Labor Law Failed," 1984: Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor Mgmt. Relations of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor and the Subcomm. on Manpower and Housing of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, Part I, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-16 (1984) (statement of
United Mine Workers President Richard Trumka); id. at 57-60 (statement of United
Food & Commercial Workers President William Wynn); id. at 71-73 (statement of
International Union of Electronic Workers President William Bywater). See
generally, T. GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?-TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR
WHEN IT's FLAT ON ITs BACK (1991).
65. See infra note 451, and accompanying text, discussing a UPS management
manual that ascribes such a purpose to the joint committees.
66. My discussions with lawyers who represent rank-and-file insurgents suggest
that some Board regions follow a less stringent deferral policy than this one. They
recognize that deferral is inappropriate, especially in the prearbitration context,
whenever the charging party is an overt dissident and the grievance would be
handled or decided by political opponents. See Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 295
N.L.R.B. No. 124, slip. op. at 2-3 (July 31, 1989) (ALJ decision); see also Roadway
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It should be clear from the way I state this distinction that
I regard it as irrational; indeed, I believe the Board should
abandon it. But I also wish to argue that the Board is making
a serious mistake in deferring any grievance to Teamster joint
committees, because, as I argue below, the entire enterprise is
illegitimate considering the Board's reasons for having a
doctrine of deferral to arbitration in the first place. Although
the Board addressed the applicability of its postarbitral
doctrine to joint committee decisions in the early cases of
Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., Inc.67 and Terminal Transport
Co., Inc. ,6 and although the Board has relied upon these
cases routinely in applying both postarbitral and prearbitral
deferral doctrines in the twenty years since,69 it has never
stopped to reexamine the question. I argue below that, in
light of the rationale for the current deferral doctrine and
given the understanding that has developed concerning how
joint committees actually operate, it makes no sense to defer
cases to joint committees. In particular, it makes no sense to
defer a ULP charge presented by a union dissident.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOARD'S POLICY REGARDING
DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION
Section 10(a) of the NLRA70 specifically empowers the
NLRB to prevent ULPs and states, "[t]his power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, law or other-
Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513, 515 (1963) (declining to defer where the grievant's
"vigorous opposition to the Teamsters Union ... strongly supports the conclusion that
the arbitration tribunal was constituted with members whose common interests were
adverse to the grievant"). In other cases, however, the Board seems to take pains to
avoid seeing conflicts between a union and a grievant. See, e.g., Browne, 278
N.L.R.B. 103, 105-06 (1986), vacated and remanded sub nom. Nevins v. NLRB, 796
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986).
67. 132 N.L.R.B. 1416, 1420-21 (1961).
68. 185 N.L.R.B. 672, 673-74 (1970). This decision was criticized in Atleson,
Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 355,
383 (1971).
69. E.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 667,668 n. 14 (1985), enforcement
denied sub nom. Garcia v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1986); Brown Co., 243
N.L.R.B. 769, 788 (1979) (AL decision); United Parcel Serv., Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 483,
490 (1978) (AJ decision); McLean Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 710, 712 & n.4 (1973).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988).
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wise ."71 Despite this clear command, there is also a strong
national labor policy favoring the use of arbitration to resolve
private, contractual disputes between labor and management.
For instance, section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act 72 (LMRA) authorizes the federal courts to enforce CBAs
and to develop a federal common law for their construction and
application.73  In the Steelworkers Trilogy74 the Supreme
Court spelled out the role of the courts in relation to voluntary
arbitration of contractual disputes. The Court relied on
section 203(d) of the LMRA," where, in the course of estab-
lishing the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to help
labor and management resolve disputes without strikes, Con-
gress declared that "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is ... the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpre-
tation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."76
Thus, in the Steelworkers Trilogy the Court held that
although courts should decide whether the contract required
arbitration of a certain dispute,77 they should refrain from
second-guessing an arbitrator's interpretation of the contract
or its application to particular facts. 78  This preference for
arbitration, however, is limited to disputes about CBAs. When
disputes arise over the application of public law to the work-
place, the courts remain available, and arbitral determinations
receive the weight that the court deems appropriate.79
As should be clear from the opening paradigm cases, many
disputes giving rise to ULP charges also may implicate
contractual rights that could be submitted for arbitral deter-
mination. When an employee is fired for exercising rights
protected by the NLRA, for example, a contract provision
requiring "just cause" for discipline also may be violated. Or
if an employer makes a unilateral change in the terms and
71. Id.
72. Id. § 185.
73. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
74. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83 & n.7; American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-68.
78. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596; American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568-69.
79. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 & n.21 (1974).
Deferral and the Dissident
494 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
conditions of employment, in violation of NLRA sections
8(a)(5) and 8(d),"° the change also may violate a term of the
contract. In such cases, the issues may be resolved appropri-
ately either by the Board, through arbitration, or both.
The Board's deferral policy attempts to accommodate its own
responsibilities to the substantial role played by arbitration
in the resolution of industry disputes. The policy actually
consists of two separate but related doctrines governing (1) the
way the Board will treat cases presented to it after an arbitra-
tor has considered issues arising out of the same dispute (the
Spielberg doctrine),81 and (2) the way the Board will treat
cases in which the issues have not been presented to an
arbitrator, though they could have been (the Collyer doc-
trine).,2 I now examine these two branches of deferral
doctrine."
A. NLRB Consideration of a Case After Arbitration
The Board set forth the standards for deferring to arbitra-
tion decisions in the seminal Spielberg Manufacturing Co.84
In Spielberg, a union settled a strike by agreeing, among other
matters, to arbitrate the question whether four of the strikers
would be denied reinstatement for picket line misconduct.8 5
With the employees actively participating in the arbitral
proceeding, the arbitration panel ruled by majority vote that
the strikers need not be reinstated.8' The NLRB decided
that "recognition" of the arbitration award was appropriate
because "[1] the proceedings appear to have been fair and
regular, [2] all parties had agreed to be bound, and [3] the
80. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1988).
81. See infra Part II.A.
82. See infra Part II.B.
83. In Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), the
majority invented, "for clarity's sake," the separate term "deferment" to describe pre-
arbitral deferral, leaving "deference" to describe post-arbitral deferral. Id. at 1490.
This article follows the traditional use of the same term for both prongs of the
deferral doctrine.
84. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). For an earlier Board decision to defer to an
arbitrator's decision regarding an employer's refusal to bargain about certain issues
during the term of a contract, see Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 501
(1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
85. Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1081.
86. Id.
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decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the [NLRA]." ' Accordingly, the
Board found that there had been no violation of the NLRA,
and dismissed the complaint.88
The Spielberg doctrine came to be applied not only to strike
settlement agreements but also to ULP charges that arose
during the term of a CBA. s During the doctrine's develop-
ment the Board recognized that there was no guarantee that
ULP issues would be resolved by the arbitrator merely because
a particular dispute had been submitted to both arbitration
and the NLRB.9" In Monsanto Chemical Co.,91 an arbitrator
considering whether an employee was discharged for union
activities decided that "'[b]ecause the NLRB has exclusive
jurisdiction in the event of a conflict [between his own view of
a possible ULP and that of the Board], I have chosen to ignore
for purposes of decision the allegations ... that Till's Union
activities played a part in his discharge."'92 The Board went
on to hold that such an arbitration award could not be given
binding effect in a subsequent ULP proceeding.93
Similarly, where a ULP was not presented to or decided by
the arbitrator, the Board has held that it is inappropriate to
allow an arbitration proceeding to determine that issue. In
Raytheon Co.,9 the union took the discharge of certain strik-
ers to arbitration, arguing that they, in fact, had not violated
87. Id. at 1082. The Board distinguished an earlier case, Wertheimer Stores
Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1954), in which it refused to recognize an award because
the discharged employee had announced from the outset his desire to secure a
hearing by the Board and had opposed the arbitration proceedings. Id.
88. Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. The Board did not explain why, given its
refusal to consider the merits in light of the arbitral award, it concluded that there
had been no violation of the Act. Later developments have made it clear that deferral
to arbitration constitutes a form of res judicata or collateral estoppel. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-88 (1984). The Board thus may
have concluded that there was no violation because it had precluded the charging
parties from disputing a crucial fact, and then held, in light of this fact, that there
had been no ULP. In any event, the result was the same: the Board did not consider
the case on the merits.
89. See Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 762 (1974); see
also infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886 (1963), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 326 F.2d 471, 473 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1964) (agreeing in dictum with the
Board's decision regarding deferral); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1098-
99 (1961).
91. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961).
92. Id. at 1099.
93. Id.
94. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471
(1st Cir. 1964).
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the no-strike clause in the contract.9" The Board refused to
be bound by the arbitrator's award in deciding whether, as
charged in the ULP proceeding, the employer had used the
clause as a pretext to punish the employees for other protected
activity.96 The Board explained that at the arbitration the
union had not introduced evidence to establish this alternate
theory, and that it was inappropriate to allow an arbitration
proceeding to resolve whether a ULP occurred where the ULP
issue was not presented to or decided by the arbitrator: "We
cannot, in giving effect to arbitration agreements, neglect our
function of protecting the rights of employees granted by [the
NLRA]."97 Accordingly, the Board ruled that it is bound by
arbitral findings only when the ULP issue has been "fully and
fairly litigated" before the arbitrator.9"
The Board followed this ruling with Airco Industrial Gases
Pacific, Division of Air Reduction Co., Inc. ,99 where it refused
to be bound by an arbitral award that did not indicate on its
face that the arbitrator had ruled on the ULP issue.'
Then in Yourga Trucking, Inc.,101 the Board ruled that the
party asserting a deferral defense bears the burden of
proving that the ULP issues had been presented adequately
in arbitration.
10 2
The Raytheon rule remained the Board's standard until
Electronic Reproduction Service Corp. °3 In that case, the
Board held that arbitral awards in discipline and discharge
cases would be given preclusive effect, even if the ULP issue
was not litigated or decided, absent "bona fide reasons, other
than a mere desire on the part of one party to try the same set
of facts before two forums, which caused the failure to in-
troduce [ULP] evidence at the arbitration proceeding."' 4
Rather than actually finding that there had been no ULP, as
in Spielberg, the Board simply dismissed the complaint to fully
95. Id. at 884-85.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 886.
98. Id. at 886-87 (quoting International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 928
(1962)); accord Illinois Ruan Transp. Corp. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 280 (8th Cir.
1968).
99. 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972).
100. Id. at 677.
101. 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972).
102. Id.
103. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
104. Id. at 762.
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"honor" the arbitral award, and indicated that it would do so
in other cases unless "special circumstances have precluded
the complaining party from having had that full and fair
opportunity to present such [ULP] evidence." °5
The Board's refusal to decide ULP cases absent special
circumstances, however, encountered severe criticism in the
courts of appeals,0 6 which held, in effect, that the Spielberg
doctrine, as modified by Raytheon, meant that additional
criteria-namely, actual litigation of the ULP issue and
arbitral expertise in the issue on which preclusion was
sought-were necessary components of a lawful postarbitral
deferral policy.' 7 Accordingly, in Suburban Motor Freight,
Inc.,' ° the Board, by then ruled by a majority of Carter
Administration appointees, overruled Electronic Reproduction
and reinstated Raytheon, Airco, and Yourga. °9 The Board
reasoned that even if Electronic Reproduction promoted
arbitration, the interests of the union, which controls the
arbitration proceeding, may well differ from those of the
individual employee, and that to allow statutory rights to be
lost without any adjudication would be a "'shocking sacrifice
of individual rights on the altar of institutionalism.' "110
The return to a strictly limited deferral policy was short-
lived, however. By 1984, the Board had swung back to the
control of antilabor members appointed by President
Reagan."' In Olin Corp.,12 the NLRB adopted a still dif-
ferent approach to deferral. The Board expressly foreswore a
wholesale return to the rule and rationale in Electronic
Reproduction."3 Rather, in an apparent effort to avoid the
objections of the courts in such cases as Stephenson and
105. Id. at 764.
106. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1977); see also NLRB
v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d 806, 811 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. General
Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965, 968-70 (3d Cir. 1981); Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d
342, 348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
107. See Stephenson, 550 F.2d at 538; Banyard, 505 F.2d at 347.
108. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
109. Id. at 146 & n.7.
110. Id. at 146 (quoting Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the
Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
897, 909 n.32 (1975)).
111. See generally Levy, The Unidimensional Perspective of the Reagan Labor
Board, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 269 (1985) (discussing the consistently antiworker and
proemployer theme of law-changing decisions issued by the NLRB beginning in 1984).
112. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
113. Id. at 575 n.10.
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Banyard, it ruled that it would not defer simply because there
was an "opportunity" to present the ULP issue in arbitra-
tion."4  To the contrary, the Board agreed that deferral
was appropriate only if the ULP issue was litigated and
decided." 5
Instead of overruling Raytheon, the Board in Olin adopted
a procedural rule for applying it. Relying on the dissent of
Board Member Hunter in Propoco,"6 the Board said that it
would find adequate consideration of the ULP issue if "(1) the
contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor
practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally
with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor prac-
tice.""7 I emphasize that Olin does not require an ultimate
finding that the ULP issue was actually considered; indeed, as
Board Member Hunter explained in his dissent in Propoco,
such a requirement is "anomalous, because arbitrators do not
have the authority to decide unfair labor practices.""'
Rather, the Board established a conclusive presumption that
if the two Olin factors are met, the ULP issue was adequately
considered, and the complaint will be dismissed."9
The Board adopted two further deferral rules in Olin which
underscore the sweeping nature of the new presumption.
First, the Board stated that an award will not be found
"clearly repugnant" under Spielberg simply because the
arbitrator's reasoning is on its face inconsistent with the
NLRA: "Unless the award is 'palpably wrong,' i.e., unless the
arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an interpretation
consistent with the Act, we will defer." 2 ° Moreover, the
Board now excuses the proponent of deferral from proving that
an arbitral award is not palpably wrong; rather, the opponent
of deferral must "affirmatively demonstrat[e]" that the bases
for deferral do not exist. 121
114. Id.
115. Id. at 574, 576.
116. Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., Div. of Propoco, Inc., 263
N.L.R.B. 136, 145 (1982) (Hunter, dissenting), enforced in unpublished opinion, 742
F.2d 1438 (2d Cir. 1983).
117. 268 N.L.R.B. at 574 (emphasis added). The Board later emphasized that only
a general presentation of facts related to the ULP issue was required. Browne, 278
N.L.R.B. 103, 105 ("The operative phrase governing our review is 'generally pre-
sented.'"), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Nevins v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1986).
118. Propoco, 263 N.L.R.B. at 145 (Hunter, dissenting).
119. See Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
120. Id. (footnote omitted).
121. Id.
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This burden of showing the defects in the arbitration is
placed on the General Counsel even when he seeks to enforce
the statutory rights of an individual employee as the charging
party. Ironically, it is the parties to the CBA, the potential
respondents in Board proceedings who may wish to invoke the
deferral defense, who, by having participated in the arbitra-
tion, are in the best position to say what actually was litigated
and decided. Similarly, the employer and the union are able
to structure the arbitration procedures to facilitate or to
hinder the consideration of statutory issues by framing the
issues to be arbitrated, formulating rules of procedure and
evidence, and selecting arbitrators who have expertise in
Board law. The employer and the union also control the
record that indicates whether the statutory issues were
litigated and decided through such mechanisms as requiring
transcripts and written opinions. Under these circumstances,
by placing the burden of proof on the General Counsel and the
individual employee as the charging party, Olin impedes
access to NLRB protections by the very persons who are least
able to protect themselves. The great increase in the rate of
deferral reflected in Board decisions since Olin shows the
impact that the change in doctrine has had.
122
122. Professor Sharpe reports that the rate of deferral in "the three decades after
Spielberg" (i.e., August 17, 1956 through January 21, 1986) was 34%, but that after
Olin the rate of deferral increased to 67%. Sharpe, NLRB Deferral to Grievance-
Arbitration: A General Theory, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 595, 635-36 (1987). Professor
Sharpe's calculations are both incorrect and misleading. First, he lists 30 of the 47
post-Olin cases as involving deferral. Id. app. II. Thirty cases out of 47 is 64%, not
67%. Including Olin itself, which Sharpe does not, would produce a total deferral
rate of 65% (31 out of 48 cases). Moreover, in analyzing the effect of Olin on the
deferral rate, Sharpe does not explain why he includes in his figures cases following
the January 19, 1984 issuance of Olin. See Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 573.
Sharpe advised me in a letter that the actual benchmark period in his study was
January 21, 1984. Letter from Calvin William Sharpe to Paul Alan Levy (Oct. 30,
1990). Thus, the true pre-Olin deferral rate, obtained by excluding the 38 cases
(including Olin) from the date of Olin through January 21, 1986, was 21% (43 out of
202 cases). In any event, the impact of Olin, therefore, has been to increase the
deferral rate from 21% to 65%. Even these figures, of course, understate the true
rate of deferral because they do not take into account the many cases that are
deferred by the General Counsel-i.e., cases in which no complaint is issued because
the General Counsel concludes that deferral is appropriate under Olin. A study of
Board deferral policies at the General Counsel level also showed a substantial
increase in deferral following Olin. Greenfield, The NLRB's Deferral to Arbitration
Before and After Olin: An Empirical Analysis, 42 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 34, 44
(1988) (in two regional offices, refusals to defer decreased from 19% of all cases in
which deferral issues were raised to 4% of such cases).
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The Olin opinion is remarkably short on explanation for
such a dramatic turnabout in Board deferral doctrine. It
states generally that deferral is desirable to encourage
arbitration, that deferral was too infrequent under Suburban
Motor Freight, and that the Board's application of the "clearly
repugnant" standard has frequently caused the Board to
decide the ULP issue de novo before deciding whether to
defer.123 The Board attempted to counter the argument that
individual employees' statutory rights will be lost under its
policy, by pointing to its "commitment to determine in each
case whether the arbitrator has adequately considered the
facts which would constitute unfair labor practices."'24 Of
course, the "adequately considered" determination is limited
to determining whether the General Counsel has succeeded in
showing the absence of the two Olin factors (the "factually
parallel" and "generally presented" standard). 125
Like the Board's Electronic Reproduction rule, the approach
to postarbitral deferral adopted in Olin has encountered rough
sledding in the courts of appeals, having been directly repudi-
ated in one case1 26 and remanded for lack of a sufficient
explanation in another;127 I am aware of no appellate court
that has upheld the validity of Olin against challenge by a
charging party. Before I consider why the courts have
repudiated Olin so roundly, however, I will examine the
prearbitral deferral cases.
B. Board Consideration of a Case Before Arbitration
The Board's prearbitral deferral policy similarly has taken
several twists and turns since it was first enunciated by the
Board in Collyer Insulated Wire, Gulf Western Systems Co. 28
123. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1520, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986).
127. Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In several other cases
courts avoided the need to confront the validity of the Olin analysis because the
decision to defer had not been explained properly in terms consistent with that
analysis. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 1-547 v. NLRB, 842
F.2d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988); Harberson v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 977, 984 (10th Cir.
1987); Nevins v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1986); Garcia v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 807,
812 (9th Cir. 1986).
128. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). In earlier cases, beginning with In re Consolidated
Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706-07 (1943), enforced on other grounds, 141 F.2d
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in 1971. The CBA at issue in Collyer not only provided for
payment of wages at certain rates, but also established a
procedure for adjusting those rates to account for changes in
duties or production methods.'29 The contract also contained
a provision stating that" '[a]ll questions, disputes or controver-
sies under this Agreement shall be settled and determined
solely and exclusively by the conciliation and arbitration
procedures provided in this Agreement.""'30  The union
claimed that the employer had improperly changed the rates
of pay for several job classifications, but instead of filing a
grievance and pursuing the matter to arbitration, it filed a
charge with the Board alleging that this conduct was an
unlawful, unilateral change in the terms and conditions of
employment, which violated section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.' 3'
The Board declared that the question of whether the em-
ployer had committed a ULP was, for all practical purposes,
the same as the question whether it had violated the contrac-
tual requirements with respect to pay rates. 32  In these
circumstances, if the Board were to hear the purely contractu-
al claim before arbitration, it would improperly permit the
union to evade its promise to arbitrate contractual dis-
putes.'3 3 Moreover, the Board said that after the arbitration
was completed, it still would have to review the award under
the Spielberg standards to "guarantee that there will be no
sacrifice of [the parties'] statutory rights if the parties' own
processes fail to function in a manner consistent with the
dictates of our law."134
785 (9th Cir. 1944), the Board occasionally declined to exercise its jurisdiction
because of the failure of a union to pursue the grievance procedure, but it never
adopted a consistent policy in that regard. Compare Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 841 &
n. 12 (plurality opinion) (stating that the policy adopted in Consolidated Aircraft was
followed, "although not consistently") with id. at 850 n.32 (Jenkins, dissenting)
(listing cases in which there was no prearbitral deferral, distinguishing the cases
cited by the plurality, and saying that Consolidated Aircraft "has been overruled by
disregard, if not by name"); see also Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor
Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 62-63 (1957) (noting that
Consolidated Aircraft was a dead letter by the 1950s, especially in section 8(a)(3)
cases).
129. 192 N.L.R.B. at 838-39.
130. Id. at 839.
131. Id. at 837.
132. Id. at 842.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 843.
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The Board began to refine and extend Collyer the following
year in National Radio Co., Inc. 13' There, a union had filed
a grievance over the discipline and eventual discharge of its
president, William O'Connell, for actions as a union in-plant
representative which, according to the employer, violated plant
rules.'36 The union took this grievance to arbitration and
also filed a ULP charge, alleging not only a unilateral change
of conditions, in violation of the duty to bargain under section
8(a)(5), but also a discharge based on antiunion animus in
violation of section 8(a)(3).'37 After the Board's General
Counsel issued a complaint and the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) decided in favor of the union, the union asked the
arbitrator, who had held a hearing on the grievance but had
not yet ruled, to continue the proceeding pending completion
of the Board's processes, and the arbitrator complied. 3
The Board, applying Collyer, decided to defer to arbitration
the basic question of whether the employer had the authority
to promulgate the rules at issue. 139 The Board decided to
defer even though the discharge also might have been held
unlawful if, notwithstanding the employer's authority to
promulgate the rule, the reason for the rule was the
employer's antiunion animus."' Despite the fact that the
remaining discrimination charges raised no question of the
employer's authority under the contract, the Board deferred
because it believed that if it were to decide cases that could
have been disposed of by arbitrators under a just cause
provision of the contract, it would discourage the invocation
and indeed the creation of voluntary arbitration procedures
under CBAs.14 '
The majority rejected criticism by Members Fanning and
Jenkins in their dissent that the decision would sacrifice the
rights of individual employees who could not control arbitra-
tions prosecuted on their behalf by the union leadership.
142
The Board responded that it was unlikely that a union official
disciplined for acting on the union's behalf would receive
135. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
136. Id. at 528-29.
137. Id. at 529.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 530.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 531-32.
142. Id. at 533 (Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting).
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insufficient protection of his interests in arbitration. 14 3 The
Board stated that the interests of the employee and his
representative are "in substantial harmony" in virtually every
case, 144 apparently ignoring the fact that in many cases
involving rank-and-file members this assumption will not be
true.
Only five years later, in General American Transportation
Corp.,' 4  and Roy Robinson, Inc.,146 the Board decided to
retain Collyer itself but to overrule National Radio, thus
refusing to defer in prearbitration cases involving either
employer discrimination or coercion under sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3),141 or union discrimination or coercion under sections
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2).14 This renewal of the parameters of
the Collyer doctrine was approved by the courts of appeals
that considered it.
149
Despite this universal judicial acceptance of the rule of
General American Transportation,"' a majority of the Board
chose to revert to the rule of National Radio in United
Technologies Corp. 5' In United Technologies, a union had
filed a grievance alleging that a foreman had intimidated an
employee and one of its stewards by threatening disciplinary
action if they did not drop an earlier grievance.'5 2 After the
second grievance was denied just short of arbitration, the
union refused to proceed to arbitration despite the employer's
request to do so, and instead filed a charge alleging that the
143. Id. at 532.
144. Id.
145. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
146. 228 N.L.R.B. 828 (1977).
147. General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 808, 810 n.7.
148. Roy Robinson, 228 N.L.R.B. at 829-30, 831.
149. See, e.g., Jack Thompson Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 684 F.2d 458, 463 n.5
(7th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Container Corp., 649 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); NLRB v. Northeast Oklahoma City Mfg. Co., 631 F.2d 669,674-76 (10th Cir.
1980).
150. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 562 (1984) (Zimmerman,
dissenting).
151. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984). In United Technologies, the majority made much
of the "universal judicial acceptance of the Collyer doctrine" in decrying General
American Transportation. Id. at 559. It ignored the fact that in that case Member
Murphy, who cast the deciding vote, had rejected National Radio rather than Collyer
itself, see General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 810-13, and that almost all of the
cases that went to the courts of appeals concerned Collyer and not National Radio,
see United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 559.
152. United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 557.
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threat was unlawful coercion under section 8(a)(1). 153  The
Board deferred this charge to arbitration, reasoning that it
was just the sort of garden-variety dispute between unions
and employers for which the arbitration process was best
suited. 5 4  It stated that the arbitration process is ill-served
if the parties are permitted "to ignore their agreement and to
petition this Board in the first instance for remedial re-
lief."'55 The majority denied the dissent's charge that indi-
vidual employees' statutory rights would be sacrificed or that
such employees would be denied access to the statutory forum
(i.e., the Board) to litigate their statutory rights because after
the arbitration was completed, the Board could review the
award only to ensure that it met the Spielberg standards.'56
The dissent noted that there was no evidence whatsoever
that application of the rule in General American Transporta-
tion for the past six years had any adverse effect on private
grievance-arbitration systems.'57 The dissent also noted
that the underlying assumptions of Collyer do not apply when
the basic question before the Board is not, as in a section
8(a)(5) unilateral change of conditions case, the application or
interpretation of a provision in a CBA."5 ' Finally, the dis-
sent concluded that recent Supreme Court decisions indicated
that the Board, not private arbitrators whose principal task is
to resolve disputes over the meaning of the contract, must
protect noncontractual, statutory, individual rights.5 9
The doctrine of prearbitral deferral has been further refined
in two significant respects since 1984.160 First, in United
153. Id.
154. Id. at 560.
155. Id. at 559. Although the term "remedial relief" appears to be redundant, the
Board has used it since 1972.
156. Id. at 560 & n.17.
157. Id. at 562 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
158. Id. at 562-63.
159. Id. at 563.
160. The United Technologies majority stated that it would continue not to defer
in certain traditional circumstances that have always been exceptions from
prearbitral deferral. Id. at 560. By and large, the Board has been faithful to this
promise, although the exceptions perhaps have been construed more narrowly. For
example, the Board still does not defer where the employer's conduct reveals a
complete rejection of the grievance procedure, see United States Postal Serv., 290
N.L.R.B. 120, 121 (1988), enforced, 906 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1990); where the employer
is charged with violating section 8(a)(5) by refusing to provide the union with
information needed for the administration of the contract, see General Dynamics
Corp., Quincy Shipbuilding Div., 268 N.L.R.B. 1432, 1432-33 (1984); where the
employer is charged under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) with interfering with employee
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Technologies, the ULP charge had been filed by the union
itself, and the union apparently had withdrawn the charge to
take advantage of NLRB processes instead.'61 As a result,
the Board has had to address the question whether ULP cases
should be deferred when the charge was filed by an individual
worker and not by the union. Although the practice differs
somewhat from region to region, in most instances individuals
as well as unions face deferral of their ULP charges,'62 even
when the charge is filed by an employee who holds no union
position and does not complain about mistreatment based on
action as a union officer.
63
Second, the Board has had to confront the question of
whether to defer if the charge is filed by an individual member
but the union is unwilling to take the issue to arbitration in
the form of a grievance. Obviously, if the union can force the
Board to hear the ULP case by the simple expedient of
refusing to arbitrate, employees could obtain an easy escape
from the Collyerization of their individual ULP claims. On the
other hand, if the Board makes the individual suffer the
consequences of the union's refusal to arbitrate, then the
Board would face the serious charge that it was delegating to
the union not only the ability to litigate ULP issues through
a non-Board proceeding that is subject to review only for its
adequacy, but also the ability to decide which ULP charges
deserve to be prosecuted. At first, the Board seemed inclined
to refuse to hear a claim when the union has refused to
arbitrate it,' 64 but ultimately the Board was unwilling to
give the union that authority. Instead, it stated that if the
union refuses to take the case to arbitration, deferral is just as
access to the Board, see Carborundum Resistant Materials Corp., Div. of Carborun-
dum Co., Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1322 (1987); Ryder/P-I-E Nationwide, Inc., 279
N.L.R.B. 207, 207 (1986); where the grievance has been denied on procedural
grounds, see Drummond Coal Co., Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 1618, 1619 n.5 (1986); or where
there are parts of the ULP case whose deferral either has not been requested or is
inappropriate, see Heck's, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. No. 132, slip op. at 16, 131 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1281, 1285-86 (May 18, 1989). For further discussion of the exception in the
case in which there is a conflict of interest between the charging party and the union
or its leadership, see supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
161. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 568 (1984) (ALJ decision).
162. See United Beef Co., Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 66, 68 (1984); General Dynamics
Corp., Quincy Shipbuilding Div., 271 N.L.R.B. 187, 189 (1984).
163. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 44, 45 (1984) (ALJ decision);
Certified Indus., Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 1138, 1145 (1984) (ALJ decision).
164. Spann Bldg. Maintenance Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 971, 971-72 (1985), enforced sub
nom. Lewis v. NLRB, 800 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1986).
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inappropriate as if it were the employer that had refused to
arbitrate.1 65  This conclusion follows from the well-settled
rule that deferral is appropriate only to a decision of an
arbitrator, and not when a union withdraws a grievance over
the objection of the employee concerned. 16
C. Board Deferral Policy Consolidated
Recently, the Board issued a decision that brings the
Spielberg and Collyer doctrines together. In Consolidated
Freightways Corp.,67 an employee complained that the
employer had changed his conditions of employment in
retaliation for his having filed certain grievances.6 8 The
union took his grievance to the joint committee but argued
only that the change violated past practices that had been
incorporated into the CBA, not that the company's motive in
making the changes was to discriminate against the employee
for his union activity in filing grievances.169  The Board
refused to defer to the joint committee decision under
Spielberg because the statutory issue had not been presented
to the committee; but in a novel twist, the Board decided to
defer to the grievance procedure under Collyer, on the theory
that it would be inappropriate to decide the ULP until the
union and the company had made an earnest effort to resolve
the dispute through their contractual procedure. 7 °
165. See Spann Bldg. Maintenance Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 915, 916 (1988).
166. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 620, 637 (1988). Where a
union settles a grievance with an employer for partial relief-such as reinstatement
without back pay-and obtains the employees' consent, however, the settlement may
bar a Board proceeding even if the employees privately intended to pursue their
Board charges. Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547-48 (1985), enforced sub nom.
Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987). The status of a settlement entered
into over an employee's objection seems unsettled. In enforcingAlpha Beta, the court
of appeals (approvingly) read the Board decision to support the proposition that such
a settlement could be the subject of deferral. 808 F.2d at 1345. Subsequently, in
Energy Cooperative, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 635 (1988), a case involving a strike
settlement agreement, the Board cited that passage with apparent approval. Id. at
637 n.16.
167. 288 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1988), enforced en banc sub nom. Hammontree v. NLRB,
925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
168. Id. at 1254.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1255.
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It is unclear whether the Board will continue to apply this
analysis, even though it was upheld on review en banc in the
court of appeals.17' In several recent decisions, some before
Consolidated Freightways'72 and some after it, 73 the Board
has refused to defer to arbitration when the statutory issue
had not been presented and has sent the case back through
the grievance procedure so that it could be.'74 Nor does
Consolidated Freightways give any indication that the Board
focused on the inconsistency between its refusal to defer under
Spielberg where the statutory issue had not been presented,
and its deferral under Collyer to the grievance procedure with
the assurance that, if the Spielberg standards, including the
presentation of the statutory issue, are not met, the Board will
not defer.
75
The decision in Consolidated Freightways has some odd
ramifications. If deferral doctrine is founded on notions of
171. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc).
172. See Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union, Local 1212, 288 N.L.R.B.
374, 374 n.7 (1988); M&G Convoy, 287 N.L.R.B. 1140, 1145 (1988) (ALJ decision);
Hilton Hotels Corp., 287 N.L.R.B. 562, 563 (1987); Aces Mechanical Corp., 282
N.L.R.B. 928, 930 (1987), enforcement denied, 837 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1988);
Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 713, 717 (1986) (AIM decision), enforced
in part, 810 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1987); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 277
N.L.R.B. 1388, 1388 n.2 (1985), enforced, 821 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1987); Hendrickson
Bros., Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 438, 439-40, enforced in unpublished opinion, 762 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1985).
173. See K-Mechanical Servs., Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. No. 25, slip op. at 2 n.2, 134
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1246, 1246 n.2 (July 26, 1990); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 297
N.L.R.B. No. 50, slip op. at 9-10 (Nov. 21, 1989) (ALl decision); System 99, 289
N.L.R.B. 723, 723 n.1 (1988); see also National Linen Serv. & Nat'l Dust Control, 293
N.L.R.B. No. 122, slip op. at 7 (May 9, 1989) (AJ decision). In one very peculiar
case, a union respondent in a duty to bargain case sought both Spielberg type
deferral, based on a decision that had already been rendered, and Collyer type
deferral, based on a pending motion for reconsideration. Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Local No. 70, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 137, slip op. at 3-4, 20-21 (July 31, 1989) (ALJ
decision). The Board refused to defer because, in the view of the AMJ, the joint
committee had erroneously assumed the truth of a particular fact that had made it
unnecessary for it to reach the ULP issues that were before the Board. Id. at 21 (AMJ
decision). Instead of deferring the case so that the joint committee could reconsider
it in light of the facts that the Board deemed correct, the Board proceeded to decide
the case. Id. at 4.
174. I have located only one case in which a result similar to that in Consolidated
Freightways was reached. See Quarto Mining Co., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 138, slip op. at
4-5, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1253, 1255 (Sept. 29, 1989).
175. Instead of discussing this apparent inconsistency, the Board treated the
aforementioned cases as if they had been cited solely for the proposition that deferral
is appropriate only if the union files the charge, but not if the individual files it.
Consolidated Freightways, 288 N.L.R.B. at 1255-56. The Board then distinguished
them because they had not relied on that distinction to support refusal to defer. Id.
at 1255 n.13.
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abstention, whereby the Board leaves questions of contract
construction to the contractual forum while reserving its own
processes for deciding statutory questions,'76 then it would
make little sense for the Board to defer where the grievance
procedure has resolved a contractual question and left a
primarily statutory one, whether there was discrimination pro-
scribed by section 8(a)(3), to be decided by the Board. 177 On
the other hand, if the deferral doctrine's objective is to sub-
stitute the private system of adjudication for the Board's
procedures, then the Board might well act as a quasi-appellate
court and should send the case back for a new private adjudi-
cation if the first adjudication does not meet postarbitral
deferral standards. The new private adjudication, one hopes,
will meet the Board's standards.
This, then, is where deferral doctrine stands today. I must
explore one additional issue before addressing the validity and
propriety of the Board's deferral policy. The Board in Olin
asserted that its new postarbitration deferral rule would
protect statutory rights because deferral would not be granted
unless the ULP issue had been presented adequately in
arbitration. 178  The Board made this assertion even though
adequate presentation is presumed under Olin when the
statutory and contractual issues are "factually parallel" and
the facts relevant to the statutory issue are "generally
presented" to the arbitrator.179  The Board's assurance that
statutory rights will be protected is significant not only for
postarbitral but also for prearbitral deferrals. The ULP
claimant is assured that the arbitration to which he is being
remanded is not necessarily the end of the line: the results
176. See National Radio Co., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 597, 531-32 & n.8 (1972) (stating
that Board deferral is analogous to the doctrine of abstention in which federal courts
allow state courts to resolve open questions of state law that might make it
unnecessary to decide a constitutional question); see also Hammontree v. NLRB, 925
F.2d 1486, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc).
177. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 113,296 N.L.R.B. No. 144,
slip op. at 14, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1297, 1301 (Oct. 4, 1989) (stating that deferral is
appropriate "because the underlying controversy is primarily contractual"); American
Commercial Lines, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 4 n.8, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1100,
1102 n.8 (Sept. 8, 1989) (noting that it will not defer where resolution of ULP turns
on legal questions). A comparable approach is used when a federal court abstains:
the party bringing the claim has the option of presenting only the state law issue to
the state court, thus reserving the right to have the federal court decide the issue of
federal constitutional law. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964).
178. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
179. Id.
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will be weighed under the Olin analysis. At this point the
question arises, how strong is the protection of Olin? It is to
this question that I now turn.
D. The Conclusive Presumption
Announced in Olin Is Irrational
The Olin presumption is based upon a model of the relation-
ship between ULPs and arbitral proceedings that admittedly
is accurate in some cases. For example, section 8(a)(5)'s
requirement of bargaining in good faith mandates, inter alia,
that employers not repudiate provisions of CBAs. 80 In a
typical case, an employer refuses to comply with a particular
provision of the contract (for example, a union security clause)
and the union files a grievance contending that the contract
requires the employer to conduct itself in a different manner.
If the arbitrator construes the contract in the manner urged
by the union, the employer normally will have no defense to a
section 8(a)(5) charge if it continues to refuse to apply the
clause. Although the arbitrator never specifically finds a ULP,
explicit reference to the ULP is unnecessary because the fac-
tual issues are identical and the arbitral findings, if followed
by the NLRB, would resolve the ULP charge. In the absence
of evidence that the arbitrator has not given proper con-
sideration to the issue that otherwise the Board would have
decided, the Board may properly defer to the arbitral award,
i.e., give it collateral estoppel effect, and issue an order finding
a ULP and awarding an appropriate remedy.'18
Unfortunately, although many cases raising deferral ques-
tions resemble this model, many do not. Each variation on
this model causes the Olin conclusive presumption-that the
arbitrator will have given adequate consideration to the ULP
issue if the "factually parallel" and "generally presented"
180. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
181. See Dennison Nat'l Co., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 22, slip op. at 6, 132 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1076, 1077 (Aug. 21, 1989); Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 251 N.L.R.B. 809, 810
(1980) (stating that even though the arbitrator "specifically stated" that he was not
deciding the ULP claim, "he made factual findings, in the course of resolving the
contractual issue, which resolve the [ULPI issues, which is all that is necessary for
deferral"); cf. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. Div., Litton Sys., Inc., 283 N.L.R.B.
973, 976 n.17 (1987) (stating that in such a case the Board need not defer reflexively
to arbitration).
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conditions are met-to be inaccurate in a different way. As
noted in Taylor v. NLRB,8 2 this inaccuracy has three sourc-
es, which I explain more fully in the three subsections that
follow:
1. The facts relevant to establishing a contract violation
may differ significantly from those relevant to the
ULP violations, although some overlap also may
exist.1 8
3
2. The standard for deciding whether a contract viola-
tion occurred may differ from the standard required
by the Board."4
3. The union may choose to litigate the arbitration
proceeding in a way that, although well-calculated to
advance its own interests by securing a desired con-
struction of the contract, is not designed to establish
that the employee was the victim of a ULP.8 5
Because the Olin standard would collaterally estop employees
from asserting their statutory rights in all these circum-
stances, despite the union's failure to present the ULP issue
and the arbitrator's failure to consider it, the standard itself
is inherently flawed and should be abandoned.
1. Differing facts-Olin's presumption is inaccurate in that
the facts necessary to sustain a ULP charge and those
relevant to the contractual grievance may be different, even
though there is enough overlap to satisfy the Olin standard.
When a worker is discharged on the ground of poor job
performance, for example, she may have a claim that the
employer lacked just cause as required by the contract, and
she also may have a claim that the discharge was based on
her performance of a legally protected activity, which would
constitute a ULP. The arbitral proceeding will focus on the
182. 786 F.2d 1516, 1520 & n.5 (1lth Cir. 1986). Footnote five of Taylor actually
lists four situations in which "factual parallelism does not always guarantee legal
parallelism." In addition to the three listed below, the Olin test may be inadequate
when a grievance committee denies a grievance but does not explain the rationale or
the evidentiary basis for its decision. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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presence or absence of just cause, and in the ULP proceeding,
the employer would no doubt argue that just cause existed for
discharge because the employee was unable to do the required
work. In that sense the two proceedings are "factually paral-
lel," and the arbitrator is "generally presented" with the facts
relevant to the ULP proceeding, i.e., the circumstances sur-
rounding the discharge and the employer's justification for it.
The employer might well be able to prevail in the contrac-
tual proceeding by demonstrating that the employee had in
fact done that which the employer charged, even if other
motives for the discharge existed."8 6 Some arbitrators might
find the pretext issue to be a basis for reinstatement, but
others might not, or the issue might never arise for a variety
of reasons." 7 But in the ULP proceeding, the presence of
just cause is not a defense for an employer who would have
discharged the employee anyway because of the employee's
protected activity. ' In arbitration it would be irrelevant
that the employee was discharged in part for engaging in
activities protected by the Act, unless the contract also made
it clear both that such activities were excluded from "just
cause" and that it was not enough for the employer to estab-
lish the existence of a just cause. Absent such a contractual
standard, the key issues in the Board proceeding would never
be litigated, much less decided by the arbitrator. Neverthe-
less, the Olin standard would be satisfied and presentation of
the ULP claim would be barred.
2. Differing standards-The Olin presumption defeats the
policies of the Act in that even though the contract and Board
law address similar conduct, they may apply different stan-
dards to determine whether the employer has violated its
obligations.8 9 In the examples that follow, each of which is
typical of a large class of cases, the ULP and contractual
issues are "factually parallel," and the facts relevant to the
ULP charge will be "generally presented" to the arbitrator, yet
the arbitrator may find no contract violation without ever
deciding the ULP issue.
186. See id.
187. See Atleson, supra note 68, at 383.
188. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398 (1983).
189. Cf. U.S. Aluminum Corp./Tex. v. Alumax, Inc., 831 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir.
1987) (denying application of collateral estoppel where standard of proof is different
in the two proceedings), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988); Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S.
Dep't of Labor, 583 F.2d 1273, 1279 (4th Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915
(1979).
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For example, an arbitration proceeding may address
whether the contract allows the employer to impose discipline
for admittedly protected conduct, such as concerted protests to
a government agency about working conditions. Even if the
issue of contractual interpretation is close, the arbitrator may
decide that, on balance, the contract should be construed to
allow the employer to discipline employees for such conduct.
For the Board, of course, the question is not simply what the
contract means, but whether the contract represents a "clear
and unmistakable" waiver of the statutory rights.19 ° Indeed,
in Metropolitan Edison, the Court found no waiver despite the
fact that arbitration decisions under the previous contract
permitted discipline.' 9 ' Nevertheless, the Board's Olin
standards would require deferral to such arbitral decisions
although the Board would find a violation upon hearing the
case de novo.
19 2
Another example of differing standards deals with the sensi-
tive question of "insubordination" by union officials or other
employees in the course of performing their duties in the
workplace. Board law provides a certain measure of protection
for union officials or employees when, in the course of arguing
with the employer over grievances, they say or do things that
might otherwise be deemed contrary to the employee-employer
relationship. Recognizing that passions may run high in the
course of concerted employee activity, the Board balances the
employee's section 7 right to engage in concerted activity
against the employer's interest in maintaining order in its
business. Thus, harsh language, a refusal to leave or return
to work, and the like may be statutorily protected conduct, so
190. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983).
191. Id. at 708-10.
192. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 1-547 v. NLRB, 842 F.2d
1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988) (criticizing the Olin standards in dictum); Dennison Nat'l
Co., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 22, slip op. at 3-6, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1076, 1076-77 (Aug. 21,
1989) (conflating issues of contractual meaning and existence of waiver in a
unilateral change case so that no repugnance was found, even though arbitrator
expressly refused to apply waiver standard). Similarly, in Olin itself, the arbitrator
had decided that, as a matter of contractual interpretation, the parties had agreed
that officers would be obligated not to participate in strikes, but, as the AI noted,
"the arbitrator did not explicitly refer to the statutory right and the waiver questions
raised by the unfair labor practice charge." Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 572, 573 (1984).
The Board, however, simply noted that the arbitrator might have found a waiver on
the record presented to him, id. at 576-77, but did not insist that the arbitrator
acknowledge the difference between Board and contractual standards and then go on
to find a waiver under Board standards.
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long as such acts are not "indefensible" in the context in which
they arise.193
Yet it is not unusual for an arbitrator, acting as a "labor
relations physician," 194 to reduce a discharge to a lengthy
suspension lest insubordination be encouraged unduly.' 95 In
the years immediately following Olin, the Board would have
interpreted Olin to preclude it from considering a ULP claim
in such a case, even if the arbitrator had failed to consider or
apply Board law.'96 More recently, the Board has held that,
where the arbitrator awards a partial remedy but refuses to
apply Board standards in doing so, deferral will be rejected as
"repugnant" to the Act.197 But where the award leaves open
the possibility that the contractual standards are not at
variance with the statutory ones, it seems that the Board will
continue to defer.
9 8
3. Differing interests-The Olin presumption also fails to
ensure consideration of Board law relating to ULPs in cases
where the union litigates the contractual issue in a manner
that advances the collective economic interest of its members,
although it may well disserve the interest of the employee who
193. See, e.g., Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 730-31 (5th
Cir. 1970); C.W. Sweeney & Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 721, 723 (1981); Pittsburgh Press Co.,
234 N.L.R.B. 408, 408 (1978); Thor Power Tool Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1379, 1380-81
(1964), enforced, 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965).
194. Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509,
1562 (1981).
195. See 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 285
(1973); M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 101, 104 (1981).
196. See, e.g., Stroh Brewery Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1604, 1606 (1985) (ALJ decision);
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 215, 216 (1984), modified on other grounds, 274
N.L.R.B. 1159 (1985); Louis G. Freeman Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 80, 81-82 (1984); see also
Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 1408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (remanding the case to the
Board because it failed to provide a rational explanation for its decision to defer).
197. United Cable Television Corp., 299 N.L.R.B. No. 20, slip op. at 11-13 & n.5,
135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1033, 1037-38 & n.5 (July 27, 1990); Cone Mills Corp.-White Oak
Plant, 298 N.L.R.B. No. 70, slip op. at 15 n.19, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1105, 1110 n.19
(May 25, 1990).
198. See Sachs Elec. Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 866, 866-67 (1986). In Sachs, the ULP
charge alleged that the employee was fired for complaining about contract violations,
but the grievance addressed whether he was fired for complaining as a union
steward. Id. The arbitration panel, a joint committee operating under an Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers contract, rejected the grievance because the
employee was not, in fact, a steward when he was dismissed. Id. at 866. Nonethe-
less, the Board deferred because the conduct in which the employee engaged as a
steward was the same as the conduct in which he had been engaged as an employee,
and that conduct was the issue in the ULP case. Id. at 866-67. The relationship be-
tween the parallelism of issues and an award's repugnance to the Act is discussed in
more detail infra at notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
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has been the victim of the ULP. Indeed, where there is a
conflict between those interests, the union's duty to its
collective membership may require it to risk harm to an
individual employee.199 For example, the union may choose
not to press the ULP aspects of the dispute because it hopes
to encourage the arbitrator to construe the contract in a way
broadly favorable to the union.
That is what happened in Hilton Hotels Corp.2 °° In a
routine application of the Olin presumption, the Board
deferred despite the following circumstances: (a) the only
facts relevant to the ULP were presented by the employer,
who was obviously not trying to show a ULP;2 1 (b) the union
argued that Board law was irrelevant to the proceeding;
20 2
(c) the union's only claim in the arbitration was one not
cognizable by the Board;203 and (d) the arbitrator's decision
plainly resolved only the contractual dispute and did not
address the factual issue that would have been relevant to the
Board.20 4 The Board did not focus on the variation between
the contractual and statutory issues until the court of appeals
remanded for a rational explanation of the decision.20 5
Perhaps the Board's ultimate decision not to defer,20 6 pur-
portedly following Olin, should be taken as proof that the
standard is defensible. My own inclination is to believe that,
at the very least, the standard invites sloppy application like
that in Hilton Hotels, and that if the Board is willing to
undertake a careful evaluation of each arbitral proceeding, the
Olin presumption ceases to be worth the problems that it
creates.
The majority opinion in Olin suggested that these three
inadequacies are beside the point because by retaining the
Spielberg "clearly repugnant" standard the Board avoids being
collaterally estopped when the arbitrator actually fails to
199. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) ("The collective bargaining
system as encouraged by Congress and administered by the NLRB of necessity
subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the collective interests of all
employees in a bargaining unit.").
200. 272 N.L.R.B. 488 (1984), enforcement denied sub nom. Harberson v. NLRB,
810 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1987), on remand sub nom. Hilton Hotels Corp., 287 N.L.R.B.
562 (1987).
201. Harberson v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 977, 980-81 (10th Cir. 1987).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 981.
205. See Hilton Hotels Corp., 287 N.L.R.B. 562, 562-63 (1984).
206. Id. at 563.
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consider an issue that is equivalent to one arising under Board
law.2 °7 This argument fails, however, because the Board in
Olin required only a very rough equivalency and made it
almost impossible to establish repugnancy to the Act. Thus,
Olin allows deferral unless the award is "'palpably wrong,' i.e.,
... not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the
Act.""' Member Hunter explained this standard in his
Propoco dissent, which essentially was adopted by the majority
in Olin, stating that the award need not even be "consistent
with the bulk of Board precedent," so long as it does not "fly[]
in the face of well-established and clear Board doctrine."
20 9
Moreover, because the application of most Board rules
requires a balancing of interests and consideration of the facts
of each case, it often is impossible to show that an arbitral
decision is "palpably wrong" in the sense that the Board could
not possibly have come to the same conclusion.210 In a
number of cases the Board has upheld arbitral decisions as not
"clearly repugnant" because, whether or not the arbitrator
applied the proper standard under Board law, it was conceiv-
able that the Board might have reached the same result by
applying the proper standard.21'
More recent cases suggest that the Board may be rethinking
the meaning of the repugnance standard and the relationship
between that standard and the parallelism of the statutory
and contractual issues. This rethinking, which has resulted
in a decreased willingness by the Board to defer to arbitral
decisions, may have been spurred by the D.C. Circuit's
resounding condemnation of the Board's sloppy analysis in
Darr v. NLRB." 2 Certainly the signs of revision became
pronounced after the Board's decision on remand.
207. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 572, 574 (1984).
208. Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).
209. Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., Div. of Propoco, Inc., 263
N.L.R.B. 136, 146 (1982) (Hunter, dissenting).
210. See, e.g., Louis G. Freeman Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 80, 80-81 (1984) (declining to
find the arbitrator's conclusion palpably wrong even though he failed to make the
necessary findings for resolution under Board law).
211. See Andersen Pestress Div., Andersen Sand & Gravel Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 1204,
1205 & n.6 (1985); Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547-48 (1985); Cone Mills
Corp.-White Oak Plant, 273 N.L.R.B. 1515, 1516 (1985), enforcement denied sub nom.
Darr v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 1986); Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 215, 217 (1984);
see also Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
212. 801 F.2d 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Many of these analytic problems are
discussed supra notes 180-211 and accompanying text.
Deferral and the Dissident
516 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
For example, in both Cone Mills213 and United Cable
Television Corp.,214 the employees had been discharged for
protesting in strong language or in an obstreperous manner
and were reinstated by an arbitrator because their conduct
was protected. They were denied back pay, however, on the
theory that some punishment was appropriate for the manner
of the protest.215 In both cases, the Board found this analy-
sis repugnant to the Act because the NLRA does not recognize
the concept of "partially protected" concerted activities.216
Similarly in Barton Brands, Ltd. ,217 a worker who had
recently begun to serve as plant chairman was discharged for
insubordination that the arbitrator concluded flowed from his
assumption that he was entitled to immediate action on a
work-related problem. 28  The arbitrator reinstated him
subject to a ban on holding union office for three years to
avoid the friction that the arbitrator believed would recur if
the worker held union office. 21 '9 The Board refused to defer
because, in attaching this condition, the arbitrator did not
expressly consider whether the worker had waived his right to
hold union office; consequently, the ULP and contractual
issues were not factually parallel.22 ° In reaching this deci-
sion, the Board applied an analysis similar to that in Cone
Mills and United Cable, holding that, because it was unlawful
to condition reinstatement on the relinquishment of a statu-
tory right, the arbitral award was repugnant to the Act.221
It is not clear whether these cases represent a new trend, or
whether a few cases involving related deferral problems, all of
which were not deferred, happen to have been decided within
months of each other. It does appear that, contrary to the
213. See Cone Mills Corp.-White Oak Plant, 298 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 134 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1105 (May 25, 1990).
214. 299 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1033 (July 27, 1990).
215. Cone Mills, slip op. at 9, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1108; United Cable, slip op.
at 9, 135 L.R.R.M (BNA) at 1036.
216. See United Cable, slip op. at 11, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1037; cf. Cone Mills,
slip op. at 15, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1110.
217. 298 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1022 (June 29, 1990).
218. Slip op. at 3, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1022.
219. Id., 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1022-23.
220. Id. at 11, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1025. But see Quarto Mining Co., 296
N.L.R.B. No. 138, slip op. at 4-5, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1253, 1255 (Sept. 29, 1989)
(refusing to defer under Olin because the arbitrator failed to consider whether the
union had waived the statutory right to bargain, but agreeing to defer under United
Technologies).
221. Barton, slip op. at 14 & n.14, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1026 & n.14.
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startling change in deferral rates that occurred immediately
following the issuance of Olin,222 the proportion of Board
deferrals in decided cases raising the Olin presumption has
declined somewhat.223 It is difficult to be certain whether
this change is the product of differences in the thinking of the
current Board members or whether it simply reflects more
skill on the part of the General Counsel in anticipating the
cases in which the Board would defer and thus not bringing
the cases to complaint.224 If the Board is moving back to-
ward more careful scrutiny of the relationship between the
issues considered by the arbitrator and the issues pending
before the Board, that is a welcome development that may
affect the validity of the Board's deferral doctrine.
The most fundamental objection to using the clearly
repugnant standard to remedy the inadequacies of the Olin
presumptions is that it unduly complicates cases in which a
deferral defense is raised, without producing any corres-
ponding benefits. The Olin presumption concerning whether
the statutory issue has been considered adequately in an
arbitral proceeding does not actually establish that fact. Even
after applying the presumption, one still must consider the
differences between the legal standards involved in the two
proceedings. If the standards issue remains to be decided
after the presumption is applied, the presumption is pointless
because it fails to determine whether the arbitrator actually
considered the statutory issue. The Board ends up trying to
repair defects in a presumption that does not make sense.
Instead, it should recognize forthrightly that the presumption
has not proved effective in practice and that it should be
abandoned as a way to ensure that the statutory issues are
litigated and considered adequately in the particular case.
And yet, if the Board did not apply careful scrutiny to the
actual congruence of statutory and contractual issues, but
rather treated Olin as a mere formality of ensuring that a
ULP issue has been considered and decided by an arbitrator,
222. See supra note 122 (reinterpreting Sharpe's data).
223. I conducted a LEXIS search (Olin or Spielberg or defer! w/6 arbitra! and date
aft January 1, 1986) in the "LABOR" directory, "NLRB" library, on October 15, 1990.
Of the most recent 100 cases, dating back to January 29, 1988, 26 involved
postarbitral deferral, 6 of which were deferred, 20 of which were not.
224. One study on the application of deferral policy in two Board regions found
that, out of 66 cases in which deferral issues were raised during the 17 months after
Olin was issued, the regional offices proceeded to consider the merits in only 2.5
cases, or 3.5% of the total. Greenfield, supra note 122, at 40-44.
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there would be numerous instances in which the Olin rule
could be satisfied without the ULP issues being considered in
a manner congruent with Board law. In that event, the Board
could not invoke Olin as a means to ensure that the public law
standards provided by the NLRA will not be sacrificed by the
doctrine of deferral to arbitration.
III. THE BOARD'S APPLICATION OF ITS DEFERRAL POLICY
TO CASES INVOLVING DISCRIMINATION AND INTERFERENCE
WITH STATUTORY RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES
IS IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER THE LMRA
Deferral of individual employees' ULP charges to arbitration
is fundamentally improper because it sacrifices the employee's
right to have his statutory rights enforced by the public
agency created by Congress for that purpose. There are two
reasons why such deferral is impermissible. First, the Act
provides that the Board, and not an arbitral body created by
private parties in order to resolve contractual disputes, is
responsible for enforcing the ULP provisions of the Act.225
The Board's attempt to force ULP cases into arbitration
undercuts Congress's purposes in providing that forum. 226
Second, as reflected in a line of Supreme Court cases,227
when an individual's statutory claim is at stake, a tribunal
charged by Congress with the adjudication of that right may
not yield its decisional authority to arbitration.
A. The Board's Relegation of Employees to Their Arbitral
Remedies Under the Contract Is Forbidden by the Act
The starting point in any analysis of Board doctrine is the
statutory language. The Act itself, however, provides rao sup-
port whatsoever for mandatory prearbitration deferral by the
Board. To the contrary, section 10(a) provides that the
225. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988); see also infra notes 228-34 and accompanying
text.
226. See infra Part III.A.
227. See infra Part III.B.
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Board's power to prevent ULPs "shall not be affected by any
other means of adjustment," whether statutory, contractual or
otherwise.22 Section 10(c), in turn, requires that if the
Board believes that a ULP has been committed, it "shall" state
its findings and "shall" require cessation of the ULP and
award affirmative relief to effectuate the purposes of the
Act.2
29
The Act allows the Board to escape these statutory responsi-
bilities in only four narrow situations, none of which applies
in the case of deferral to arbitration. First, the Board may
decline jurisdiction over disputes involving "any class or
category of employers" if the effect of a labor dispute on
commerce is too insubstantial to warrant exercise of jurisdic-
tion.23° Second, section 3(b) allows the Board to delegate its
powers over certain representational issues under section 9 to
its regional directors, and to delegate any of its powers to any
group of three or more Board members.231 Similarly, sec-
tions 10(b) and 10(c) allow delegation of ULP enforcement
power to hearing examiners (now ALJs) whose recommended
orders become law unless overturned by the Board after de
232
novo review. Third, the Board is empowered by section
10(a), subject to certain limitations, to allow state or territori-
al agencies to enforce their statutes pertaining to certain
industries, so long as they are consistent with the correspond-
ing provisions of the NLRA.233  Finally, section 10(k) re-
quires the Board to dismiss secondary boycott charges arising
out of interunion jurisdictional disputes if the parties have
reached a "voluntary adjustment of the dispute," and allows
the Board to postpone a hearing on such an issue if the parties
have "agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment" of
it. 234 None of these provisions comes close to giving the
Board carte blanche to delegate its responsibility for enforce-
ment of the Act to arbitration. To the contrary, the very fact
228. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988).
229. Id. § 160(c). Indeed, the Board would violate section 10(c) if, presented with
a properly issued ULP complaint, it failed to decide whether or not the respondent
had committed a ULP. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418 v.
NLRB, 711 F.2d 348,362 (D.C. Cir. 1983); International Union, United Auto. Workers
v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1330, 1331-32 (6th Cir. 1970).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1988).
231. Id. § 153(b).
232. Id. § 160(b), (c).
233. Id. § 160(a).
234. Id. § 160(k).
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that Congress has so closely confined the Board's delegation
authority suggests that the Board is not empowered to
surrender its authority in other circumstances.
This interpretation of the NLRA is confirmed by the
provisions of the bill introduced by Senator Wagner in March
1935.235 During Senate hearings in 1934, witnesses from
company unions and employers testified that the provisions in
many contracts that barred discrimination against workers
and that provided grievance and arbitration procedures for
employees to redress instances of discrimination protected
workers adequately.236 One businessman denounced the bill
for superimposing requirements on existing agreements and
for subjecting businesses to suits over differences they agreed
to settle contractually.2 37  In response, Senator Wagner
included in his 1935 bill a proposed section 10(b) that would
have given the Board authority to "defer its exercise of juris-
diction" over ULPs where there was another means of protec-
tion "provided for by agreement, code, law, or otherwise,"
although the Board would have retained its authority to
institute proceedings thereafter.2 38
Senator Wagner explained that he understood that "[t]he
practical effect of letting each industry bargain and haggle
about what section 7(a) means is that the weakest groups who
need its basic protection most receive the least."2 39 Accord-
235. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (original Senate print), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1301
(1949) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA].
236. To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate
Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 725 (1934) [hereinafter Hearings
on S. 2926], reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 763
(statement of Arthur H. Young, Vice President, United States Steel Corporation); id.
at 792, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 830 (statement
of Frank Purnell, President, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.); id. at 822, reprinted in
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 860 (statement of Paul D. Berry,
Chairman, Employee Group of the General Offices of the American Rolling Mill); id.
at 831, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 869 (statement
of Robert F. Colley, Employee Representative, Wheel Works Division of the American
Rolling Mill).
237. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 236, at 712, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 750 (statement of Hal H. Smith, National
Automobile Chamber of Commerce).
238. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b) (1935) (original Senate print), reprinted
in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 1301.
239. National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate
Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-51 (1935) [hereinafter
Hearings on S. 1958], reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at
1426-27. But see Schaefer v. NLRB, 464 U.S. 945, 947 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
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ingly, he proposed to allow the NLRB to defer the exercise of
its jurisdiction to permit such tribunals to prove their effec-
tiveness, while reserving the right to intervene afterward if
the private tribunal did not do an adequate job. 4' This
seems, in essence, to be the NLRB's current position on defer-
ral to arbitration. However, the deletion of section 10(b) from
the bill,241 on the recommendation of the Committee on Ed-
ucation and Labor,242 undercuts any notion that the Con-
gress that passed the NLRA intended to permit deferral in
cases such as this.
A review of the legislative history does not reveal any
explicit explanation for the elimination of proposed section
10(b). The best explanation seems to be that the Senate Com-
mittee encountered a blizzard of criticism from many unions
and scholars about the impact of arbitration on workers'
rights. Most of these objections were based on a belief that
arbitration was inadequate to protect workers against dis-
crimination, and was generally contrary to the interests of
workers.243 Others argued that the mediators and arbitra-
tors should deal only with rules established by agreement,2"
while the Board should be concerned with the administration
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that the failure to defer contradicts "our
entire national labor policy, which recognizes that the societal rewards of private
negotiations outweigh any need for uniformity of result or adjudicative resolution of
every labor dispute").
240. See Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 239, at 51, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 1427.
241. See S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1935) (as reported, 2d Senate print),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2291.
242. 74 CONG. REC. 7651 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra
note 235, at 2351.
243. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 239, at 716-17, reprinted in
2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2102-03 (statement of William H.
Davis, Chairman, Twentieth Century Fund Inc.'s Committee to Investigate
Controversial Subjects of Public Interest); id. at 745-46, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2131-32 (brief of the Brotherhood of Railroad Shop
Crafts); id. at 811-15, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at
2197-201 (speech of Louis Weinstock, National Secretary of the American Federation
of Labor Trade Union Committee for Unemployment Insurance and Relief); see also
Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 236, at 485-89, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
NLRA, supra note 235, at 519-23 (statement of George H. Powers, Representative of
steel worker delegation from Bethlehem Steel Co., Sparrows Point, Maryland); id. at
489, 492, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 523, 526
(statement of E.P. Cush, National President, Steel and Metal Workers Industrial
Union).
244. Cf S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2307 (stating that unfair labor practices
would not be subjects for mediation).
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of the rules enacted by Congress. 245 This opposition to the
use of arbitration as a means of enforcing the public law
norms of the NLRA, to which Congress ultimately acceded by
deleting the proposed language concerning deferral, belies the
Board's contention that section 10(a) was intended to foster
Board deferral to arbitration.
Another indication of the reason for the elimination of the
provision is the apparent adoption of a criticism of the deferral
approach advanced by Harry A. Millis, a member of the NLRB
while it functioned under a joint resolution, before passage of
the Wagner Act.246 Millis thought it important that the
Board have "the final say in the interpretation of the law," and
saw two ways of accomplishing this: either "by a right of
appeal" to the NLRB from another adjudicator's decision, or by
placing "exclusive jurisdiction" of ULP cases in the Board.247
"If practicable, the latter arrangement appeal[ed to him] as
the better of the two," because it would minimize the delay in
resolving disputes and lead to a more effective use of private
dispute resolution mechanisms. 24' The Senate Committee
seems to have agreed with this recommendation. Thus, the
Committee explained its revised version of the bill by stating,
inter alia, that the old Board had no appellate jurisdiction
over arbitrators' decisions; 249 that the Act must be "enforced
... rather than broken by compromise; and its enforcement
must reside with governmental rather than with quasi-private
agencies; "2' ° and that consequently the Board now would
have "exclusive jurisdiction" over ULP redress and preven-
tion.25' These statements, in the very report that accom-
panied the deletion of the deferral language that the Board
245. See Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on
Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 289 (1935) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 6288], reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2763 (statement of Frances
Perkins).
246. President Roosevelt established the National Labor Relations Board on
June 29, 1934, through an Executive Order authorized by Public Resolution 44. Exec.
Order No. 6763 (1934), reprinted in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 322 (S. Rosenman ed. 1938). From 1940 to 1945, Millis was
the Chairman of the NLRB. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO
TAFT-HARTLEY 236 (1950).
247. Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 239, at 183, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 1563 (statement of H.A. Miller).
248. Id.
249. S. REP. No. 573, supra note 244, at 4, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
NLRA, supra note 235, at 2304.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 15, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at
2315.
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has described accurately as creating a form of "appellate juris-
diction,"252 do not simply represent a wringing of hands over
a possible problem that the Board has now been ingenious
enough to solve. To the contrary, it is apparent that the
Senate Committee chose to follow Millis's recommendation by
rejecting the deferral-appellate jurisdiction approach, and
choosing instead to vest exclusive jurisdiction over ULPs in
the Board. As a result, the Board lacks the authority to
proceed down a road that Congress has considered and
rejected." 3
If the NLRA were the only statute at issue in this case, that
would be the end of the matter; however, the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act 254 (LMRA) must be considered also.
Section 203(d) of the LMRA states that "[flinal adjustment by
a method agreed upon by the parties is ... the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the ap-
plication or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement."255 In addition, the conference committee in 1947
specified that it did not intend the Board to use its ULP
252. NLRB Petition for Rehearing at 12, Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (No. 89-1137).
253. In its Petition for Rehearing in Hammontree, the NLRB speculated that the
reason the deferral language was deleted was that Secretary Perkins had criticized
proposed section 10(b) because it might discourage arbitral bodies from acting unless
the Board formally deferred to them. Id. at 10 n.20; see also NLRB In Banc Brief at
27, Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (No. 89-1137). But her
criticism was not directed to the deferral language; she just proposed a reordering of
the language of sections 10(a) and 10(b) because she was afraid that, as worded, the
sections would not permit industrial boards to consider a particular ULP case unless
the NLRB had first asked it to take the case up. Hearings on H.R. 6288, supra note
245, at 184, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2758
(statement of Frances Perkins). Because the Senate deleted the provision altogether,
rather than simply rewording it, her arguments do not provide a reasonable
explanation for the Senate's action. Indeed, as passed, the Act retained a provision
similar to the language to which Secretary Perkins had objected: section 10(b)
provides for a hearing "before the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated
agent or agency." 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988). Discussing this provision, Senator
Wagner made clear his view that it permitted the Board to designate industrial
boards as well as regional agencies to make findings and recommendations, which
"[i]n all cases.., will be transferred to the [NLRB] for final action." 79 CONG. REC.
7569 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2332
(statement of Senator Wagner). If the Board used industrial boards as Senator
Wagner contemplated, it would both assign and review cases de novo as it does with
ALJs today. This aspect of the legislative history shows that Congress rejected Secre-
tary Perkins's analysis, rather than accepting it by deleting the proposed section
10(b), as the Board would have it.
254. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1988).
255. Id. § 173(d) (emphasis added).
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authority to take over the job of enforcing CBAs. 56  But
these authorities cannot justify an attempt to abdicate the
Board's power to decide ULP cases because the highlighted
language makes it clear that section 203(d) is limited to
contractual disputes and does not extend to statutory
claims. 7  Moreover, unless a ULP claim hinges on a con-
256. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947), reprinted in
1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947,
at 545-46 (1947) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY LMRA]. In Collyer Insulated
Wire, Gulf Western Systems Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), the Board relied on a
comparable passage in the Senate Committee report that indicated the Committee's
intent that the Board would develop a policy of" 'entertaining under these provisions
only such cases ... as cannot be settled by resort to the machinery established by the
contract itself, voluntary arbitration.'" 192 N.L.R.B. at 840-41 & n.8 (quoting S. REP.
NO. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY LMRA,
supra, at 429). But this passage appears in a discussion of provisions that would
have made it a ULP for an employer or a union to violate the terms of a CBA, and
the Committee's reference to "these provisions" makes clear that the deferral doctrine
desired by the Committee was limited to ULP charges involving that sort of violation.
Far from supporting the extension of Collyer beyond the sort of unilateral modifica-
tion charge that was at issue there, the fact that even the proponents of a procedure
comparable to deferral limited their proposal to ULPs of that kind strongly supports
the proposition that Congress never intended the Board to defer discrimination
charges and other charges that are not founded on contract enforcement.
257. In its early cases, the Board relied on the contrast between the policy of the
LMRA strongly favoring arbitration of contract disputes, and the policy of the NLRA
strongly favoring the Board as the expositor of national labor policy and enforcer of
statutory rights, to support deferral in ULP cases that depended on contractual
questions. See, e.g., International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-28 (1962).
The Board reasoned that the Supreme Court had warned it not to "effectuate the
policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other
and equally important Congressional objectives." Id. at 927 (quoting Southern
Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)). Because the Board saw its power
to defer as flowing from the limitations placed on section 10(a) by the subsequent
enactment of the LMRA, it limited deferral to circumstances in which the LMRA's
proarbitration policy applied-ie., to cases involving "application or interpretation"
of the CBA. See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988). Where the ULP charge does not depend
on a question of-contract interpretation, the LMRA policy would not apply; thus, the
Board would lack the authority to defer.
In early Board cases like International Harvester, the Board focused on the
countervailing policies of the NLRA and the LMRA. It was in those cases and thus
on that rationale that the Supreme Court approved of deferral where the deferral
policy was tangentially relevant to the question of whether the Board would permit
suits to enforce the CBA to proceed despite the fact that Board law also was
implicated. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 270-72 (1964); see
also infra note 272. In defending the current deferral doctrine, however, the General
Counsel has sought to jettison the old rationale, insisting instead that section 10(a)
imposes no limits on the Board's power to defer; rather, the question of when and
how to defer is said to be "committed [solely] to the Board's sound discretion." NLRB
In Banc Brief at 16, Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (No. 89-
1137). The court of appeals, en banc, apparently agreed with this interpretation as
applied to prearbitral deferral. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1491 (D.C.
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struction or application of the CBA, the litigation of ULP
charges does not amount to the enforcement of the CBA; thus,
the enactment of the LMRA and Congress's express desire not
to involve the Board in contract enforcement does not support
a deferral to arbitration in most cases.258
Furthermore, the version of the LMRA that passed the
House did not contain the sentence in section 10(a) which pro-
vides that the Board's power to remedy violations of the NLRA
is not affected by contractual or other means of adjust-
ment. 25 9 The Conference Committee, however, retained the
sentence, explaining that it intended that Board remedies be
available in addition to remedies under statutory provisions
allowing suits in federal courts, such as sections 301 and 303
of the LMRA,26 ° rather than that one remedy be supplanted
by the other.261 Congress's repeated refusal to permit Board
remedies to be supplanted by other means of adjustment,
coupled with the Act's express language preserving NLRB
authority, compels one to conclude that Congress intended the
Board to make its processes available to individual employees
claiming a statutory violation whether or not protection also
might be available under grievance procedures fostered by the
law of section 301 of the LMRA.
The Board has suggested that permitting an employee to
invoke the Board's jurisdiction would allow the union to evade
its promise to arbitrate contractual disputes.262 But that
argument lacks merit. A union does not promise by any
means, either that it will take to arbitration all disputes about
the meaning of the contract, or that in the cases which it does
arbitrate, it will make all conceivable arguments under the
Cir. 1991) (stating that "§ 10(a) is an affirmative grant of authority to the Board, not
an express limitation on the Board's authority").
258. Cf. supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing how deferral is
analogous to federal abstention).
259. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(a) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY LMRA, supra note 256, at 193.
260. 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 187 (1988).
261. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, supra note 256, at 52, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY LMRA, supra note 256, at 556.
262. Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1494 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc);
United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559-60 (1984); Of course, the employer
(or other respondent) is permitted to involve the Board in the dispute simply by not
raising the deferral defense. If the Board truly were concerned about preventing the
parties from evading the promise to arbitrate, it would refuse to consider ULP claims
even when the employer did not raise that defense; rather, it would order the
respondent to arbitrate the dispute and refuse to consider the ULP unless the
charging party cooperated in processing the dispute through the grievance procedure.
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contract and the NLRA. Indeed, the stability of the grievance-
arbitration system rests on an implicit union commitment to
screen employee complaints and to prosecute grievances up
through arbitration only if it believes that they are both
meritorious and important enough to the collective interest to
warrant such treatment.263 Thus, the fact that a union has
chosen not to advance a particular claim or argument does not
mean that there may not be a worthy and important claim
that statutory rights have been violated. It does no violence
to the promise to arbitrate contractual disputes to allow such
statutory claims to be resolved by the NLRB.264
As the Board contends, though, in some limited circum-
stances, allowing a union to invoke the NLRB's processes for
a ULP claim may amount to an evasion of the promise to
arbitrate contractual disputes. For example, when a union
claims that the employer has violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d)
of the Act by unilaterally modifying a term of the contract, the
ULP claim is entirely dependent on the meaning of the
contract, and the union may be obliged to resort to its own
grievance machinery before coming to the Board. In that kind
of case, if a union could come to the Board whenever it could
make out a claim of unilateral modification, it could substitute
the Board for the arbitrator in defining the meaning of its
contract.265 The language and legislative history of the
LMRA 266 support the application of Collyer and Spielberg to
those sorts of cases.
Accordingly, in such cases the Board may properly insist
upon waiting until the grievance procedure has come to an
end. It may refuse to decide the merits if the union withdraws
the grievance because the union's own conduct has short-
circuited the grievance procedure. But where the claim is
263. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-92 (1967).
264. The en bane majority made a similar error in Hammontree when it insisted
that section 203(d) supports the Board's prearbitral deferral policy because the
contractual claim and the statutory claim are independent ones, and the employee
'cannot nullify his contractual claim simply by choosing to pursue his statutory
claim." 925 F.2d at 1494. This analysis would be sound only if employees (and
unions) had a legal duty to pursue all possible contractual claims, and if the existence
of parallel contractual claims was a sufficient basis under section 203(d) to force the
case into the grievance procedure. But the Supreme Court's teaching in Lingle v.
Norge, Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) is precisely to the contrary:
it is precisely because the two claims are independent that both may be pursued
independently, or one may be pursued but not the other. See id. at 410-12.
265. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1985).
266. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
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simply one that arises under a statutory provision, which
happens to be parallel to a claim that could be advanced under
the contract, the national policy favoring arbitration is
scarcely disserved by the coexistence of two different forums
for enforcing two parallel, but independent, rights.267
This distinction could explain virtually all of the decisions
in the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court in which the
Board's deferral doctrines have either been approved or
disapproved. Cases in which the courts have invalidated
Board deferrals because its deferral doctrine failed to ensure
sufficient protection for statutory rights have been individual
discrimination cases under section 8(a)(3), 268 or interference
cases under section 8(a)(1) in which the statutory claim was
independent of the meaning of the CBA 269 Moreover, in
almost all of the Collyer cases where the Board's deferral
doctrine has been approved, the union and the employer were
the real parties in interest; both had ready access to arbitra-
tion, and both could use that forum to vindicate their posi-
tions. Almost all of these cases involved ULP charges where
the issue was whether one party to the contract had violated
an agreement whose meaning was subject to arbitration.
Sometimes the issue was the "checkoff' agreement,27 ° some-
times the charge involved an alleged modification of the
CBA, 271 and sometimes the question pertained to contractual
jurisdictional provisions.272
267. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410-13.
268. See, e.g., Harberson v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 977, 983-84 (10th Cir. 1987)
(involving discipline for a sympathy strike); Garcia v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 807, 809, 811
(9th Cir. 1986) (involving discharge for refusing to honk a horn in violation of an
antinoise ordinance); Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986) (involving
discharge for refusing to drive a truck in disrepair).
269. See, e.g., Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (involving
discharge for refusal to drive unsafe vehicles). But see NLRB v. City Disposal Sys.,
Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 838-39 (1984) (involving a discharge for refusing work in reason-
able reliance on an alleged contractual right to do so; dictum that Board "may defer"
to the extent that the same factual issues are involved in the contractual and
statutory proceedings).
270. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also
Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1974) (involving mainte-
nance of membership agreements). In these cases, it is the employer, not the union,
whose interests are aligned with those of the employee.
271. See Local Union No. 2188, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d
1087 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973); American
Fire Apparatus Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1967).
272. William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters District Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974),
involved a suit to enforce contractual provisions in a jurisdictional dispute, for which
section 10(k) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1988), prescribes arbitration as the
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The argument based on the union's promise to arbitrate
contract disputes does not apply where the issue is whether
the employer has discharged or otherwise adversely treated an
individual for a reason which, whatever its status under the
CBA, is forbidden by the Act. Thus, the argument fails in the
typical union discrimination case under section 8(a)(3) or
section 8(a)(1) where the employee's conduct was admittedly
concerted or protected, and the issue is whether the conduct
caused the adverse treatment by the employer.273 Nor does
the argument apply in the other type of section 8(a)(1) case in
which the employer admits interference with an employee's
efforts to communicate and the issue is whether the
employer's assertion of its property rights or its interests in
effective operation, regardless of how well-founded the
contractual claim, is outweighed by the employee's statutory
right to engage in concerted activity. 4
preferred means of settlement. See 417 U.S. at 14, 17-18. The Court refused to allow
the union to invoke the mere possibility of Board proceedings as a defense to the
company's state court action to enforce the contractual obligation to arbitrate and not
to strike. Id. at 20. The Court noted, quoting the Board in Collyer Insulated Wire,
192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842-43 (1971), that in such situations the Board itself might defer
to the contractual procedure. 417 U.S. at 16. In Carey v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), which also involved a jurisdictional dispute, the Court
refused to allow the parties to evade their promise to arbitrate on the ground that the
same dispute might later come before the Board, stating that "we see no barrier to
use of the arbitration procedure." Id. at 272.
273. Deferral was, however, approved in Lodge 700, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
NLRB, 525 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), where, in addition to making a number of claims
that the company had unilaterally modified the contract, the union also charged that
the company had harassed and discriminated against its stewards in an effort to
suppress the union. Id. at 243, 245.
274. The argument was squarely rejected, at least in the context of prearbitral
deferral, by the en banc majority in Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir.
1991). This court, however, repeatedly limited its holding to the prearbitral deferral,
see, e.g., id. at 1493 (arguing that Congress had no "clear intent to preclude the Board
from deferring ... until the claimant has exhausted grievance remedies"); id. at 1494
(holding that "§ 203(d) does not preclude Board deferment of that claim"); id. at 1499
(concluding that the "Board's deferment policy constitutes a permissible and
reasonable construction of the NLRA and the LMRA"). The majority even went to the
extent of inventing a new term, "deferment," to clarify the difference, id. at 1490, and
thus limit its holding. The court also recognized that in the case before it there was
no evidence of union hostility to the employee; imposition of an exhaustion
requirement in such cases "might indeed 'constitute[ ] not deference, but abdication.'"
Id. at 1498 (quoting Local Union No. 2188, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 494
F.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974)). Deferral of an
individual's charge of retaliation for the exercise of section 7 rights also was upheld
in Lewis v. NLRB, 800 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1986). The case was remanded, however,
to ensure that jurisdiction was retained on a broad enough basis to permit
reconsideration in the event that the union failed to go forward with the grievance.
Id. at 821. When that failure occurred, the Board ultimately refused to defer and
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991]
Moreover, CBAs rarely require that the parties submit all
disputes to the grievance procedures for resolving contract dis-
putes between the union and the employer. Rather, most con-
tracts limit the grievance procedure, particularly the authority
of an arbitrator when the parties are unable to agree on the
resolution of a grievance, to grievances or questions of
interpretation "arising under" the CBA.275 Accordingly, if
the NLRB were to refuse to hear individual employees'
statutory claims simply because of the existence of a voluntary
procedure to hear contractual claims, that would be precisely
the sort of abdication of authority that Congress sought to
prevent in 1935 and 1947.276
Deferral of ULP claims pending submission to arbitration is
contrary to another provision of the NLRA. Section 10(m)2 77
provides that discrimination charges under sections 8(a)(3)
and 8(b)(2) must be given priority treatment and decided
ahead of all other kinds of cases, except secondary boycott
cases. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress
wanted decisions to be made in such cases as soon as possible
because it recognized that the victims of discrimination often
face a threat to their livelihoods and those of their depen-
dents. 278  This objective is scarcely advanced if, instead of
deciding cases quickly, the NLRB postpones its decision by
requiring the employee to resort to arbitration. Nor is it
advanced if, under the Consolidated Freightways decision,279
the NLRB sends the employee back to arbitration after the
Board concludes that his union should have made different
arguments the first time the case was before the arbitrator.2 °
reached the merits of the ULP charge. Spann Bldg. Maintenance Co., 289 N.L.R.B.
915, 916 (1988); see also Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 & n.6
(1962) (discussing in dictum the Board's deferral policies where overlapping jurisdic-
tion causes serious problems).
275. E.g., NMFA, supra note 25, art. 8, §§ 1, 5(b).
276. See supra notes 235-61 and accompanying text.
277. 29 U.S.C. § 160(m) (1988).
278. H. REP. NO. 741,86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF
1959, at 785 (1959).
279. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1988), enforced en banc
sub nom. Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
280. Id. at 1256. Indeed, if the Board meant what it said in Consolidated
Freightways, deferral cannot be justified as only a temporary delay in the adjudica-
tion of an employee's rights under the NLRA. But see Hammontree v. NLRB, 925
F.2d at 1497 (stating that "[d]eferment does not diminish Hammontree's right to a
public forum; it merely delays it"). Thus, if the union goes back to arbitration and
presents the discrimination argument in a way that the Board later decides is not
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Some have argued that, even if individual cases are delayed,
the processing of discrimination charges as a class is expedited
by requiring all such claims to be submitted to the grievance
procedure first, because the grievance procedure may elimi-
nate the need to consider some statutory claims.28 ' Judge
Mikva's dissenting opinion in Hammontree has the better of
this argument when he points out that the courts, too, "could
do some docket clearing by deferring anytime the defendant
wanted to go to an arbitrator of his or her choosing. But
administrative efficiency was certainly not the goal expressed
by Congress in § 10(m)."28 2 To the extent that Congress has
expressed a view about which cases should be cleared off the
docket by deferring them to some other procedure, then, if
section 10(m) means anything, it must mean that it is the
nondiscrimination cases that are to be cleared off the docket
to make room for the litigation of discrimination cases. To
quote the Supreme Court in another context, "If the [union]
member becomes exhausted, instead of the remedies, the
issues of public policy are never reached and an airing of the
grievance never had."283
Deferral does violence to the national labor policy with
respect to arbitration in yet another important respect. The
crucial feature of the American labor relations system-one
which stands out from almost every other system in the
world-is that although it requires the parties to bargain with
each other and regulates their bargaining procedures in
various ways, the parties are free to choose the terms and
conditions of their bargain. Both the Board and the courts are
strictly forbidden to dictate the terms of the agreement, and
no party is required to accept any particular contract provi-
sion."' Yet the Board's prearbitral deferral policy means
that if a union and employer bargain for an arbitration clause,
that clause must be construed-no matter what its contents or
adequate under the Olin standards, then under the theory of Consolidated
Freightways it presumably will send the employee back to arbitration yet a third
time, until the arguments are presented by the union in a way that the Board regards
as sufficient. And, if the arguments are presented in a sufficient manner, then,
applying Olin, the Board would necessarily defer to the decision of the arbitrator.
281. Hamrnmontree, 925 F.2d at 1495.
282. Id. at 1511 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
283. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418,
425 (1968).
284. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102
(1970).
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the intent of the parties-as if it included a promise that all
claims asserting that the NLRA has been violated will be sub-
mitted to arbitration. Even if that policy does not discourage
unions that want to preserve their access to the Board from
agreeing to arbitration clauses in the first place, it certainly
will have the effect of depriving the bargaining parties of the
right to choose freely their own terms and conditions relating
to when and how arbitration will occur.
When an employee seeks Board consideration of her ULP
claim following an arbitration decision, a different set of
policies is invoked to support deferral. Thus, one might argue
that when an employee has voluntarily submitted her claim to
an arbitration proceeding, it is unfair to give her a second bite
at the apple by submitting the same dispute to a public
tribunal. This argument has two principal flaws. First, given
the current state of the Board's prearbitral deferral doctrine,
it hardly is fair to treat the submission to arbitration of a
dispute raising ULP issues as voluntary on the employee's
part because if the dispute is even conceivably arbitrable, the
Board will refuse to consider it until the employee has tried
arbitration.
Second, and more fundamentally, one may ask what is
wrong with an employee invoking the powers of two separate
tribunals, each specializing in the resolution of two different
kinds of questions, each having distinct advantages in
resolving some questions and disadvantages in resolving
others? That is, the contract may give the employee one set
of rights, including, for example, placing of the burden of proof
on the employer to show a good reason for a discharge, that
may be more advantageous to the employee than the rights
she has under the NLRA that require her to prove that the
employer had a bad motive for the discharge that the NLRA
condemns. The NLRA, on the other hand, may afford the
employee certain advantages, such as the right not to be
discharged for certain illegitimate reasons, even if she per-
forms poorly or even if the union chooses for whatever reason
to accept the employer's reasons for her discharge in a
particular instance. If the public has decided, through the
enactment of the ULP provisions in section 8(a) of the Act,
that certain reasons for discharge are impermissible, why
should a worker not be able to take advantage of that judg-
ment while also seeking to take advantage of the particular
protections provided by a contractual forum?
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The standard response to this contention is that the Board's
Olin doctrine takes care of this problem by committing the
Board to "determine in each case whether the arbitrator has
adequately considered the facts which would constitute
[ULPs]."28 5 Of course, the "adequately considered" determi-
nation is limited to determining whether the General Counsel
has succeeded in showing the absence of the two Olin factors
(the "factually parallel" and "generally presented" stan-
dard).2 6  Accordingly, the persuasiveness of this response
depends on the validity of the conclusive presumption, and, as
we have already seen, the conclusive presumption simply does
not stand up under scrutiny.2 7
Finally, it is occasionally said, albeit without empirical
support, that the NLRB's new deferral rules are needed to
encourage the use of arbitration.2"' In fact, the available
evidence suggests that the proportion of all CBAs that provide
for arbitration has remained essentially constant since the
early 1960s and has not been affected by the various changes
in Board prearbitral or postarbitral deferral doctrines.28 9
285. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
286. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
287. See United Scenic Artists, Local 829 v. NLRB, 762 F.2d 1027, 1033-35 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (rejecting the Board's presumption because the conclusion does not follow
from its premise).
288. E.g., United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559-60 (1984).
289. According to reports prepared by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), between 1972 and 1981 the number of contracts that contained
arbitration provisions consistently exceeded 92%. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 1729, CHARACTERISTICS OF AGREEMENTS COVERING 2,000
WORKERS OR MORE 70 (table 67) (1972) (92.9%); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 1784, CHARACTERISTICS OF AGREEMENTS COVERING 1,000
WORKERS OR MORE 65 (table 67) (1973) (97.4%); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 1822, CHARACTERISTICS OF AGREEMENTS COVERING 1,000
WORKERS 64 (table 70) (1974) (98.1%); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULLETIN 1957, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENTS 94 (table 8.1) (1977) (96.1%); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULLETIN 2013, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS 82 (table 8.1) (1979) (95.7%); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2065, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS 105 (table 8.1) (1980) (96.2%); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2095, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS 112 (table 8.1) (1981) (96.7%). In 1989, a private group began
publishing a similar report. See CONTRACT LIBRARY INFORMATION SERV., REPORT
8801-1, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR PRIVATE SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS (table 8.2) (1989) (96.8%).
The Bureau of National Affairs' Basic Patterns in Union Contracts series shows a
similar pattern. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION
CONTRACTS 15:130 (3d ed. 1954) (89%); BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC
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This graph should permanently lay to rest the proposition that
the percentage of CBAs containing arbitration clauses has any
meaningful relationship to the changes in Board deferral
doctrine.
PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 51:7 (4th ed. 1957) (91%); BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 51:8 (5th ed. 1961) (94%); BUREAU OF
NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 51:7 (6th ed. 1966) (96%);
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 51:6 (7th ed.
1971) (94%); BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS
37 (8th ed. 1975) (96%); BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION
CONTRACTS 15 (9th ed. 1979) (96%); BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS
IN UNION CONTRACTS 16 (10th ed. 1983) (97%); BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC
PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (11th ed. 1986) (99%); BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (12th ed. 1989) (98%); see also
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1974) (rejecting the contention
that permitting the enforcement of statutory rights outside the arbitration system
would discourage employers from accepting contract clauses adopting arbitration).
290. This graph is derived from data provided by the BLS and BNA reports cited
supra note 289.
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B. The NLRB May Not Refuse to Hear an Individual
Worker's Claims of Statutory Violation Simply
Because His Union Could Make Such
Arguments in Arbitration
Many of the objections to deferral discussed above apply to
every kind of statutory right. But they have less force when,
as in Collyer, the right at stake in the ULP proceeding is one
enjoyed by the collective-bargaining unit as a whole or by the
union as an institution. In such cases, it is reasonable to
assume that the union's interest in enforcing the contract will
be fully congruent with its interest in obtaining a favorable
ULP ruling. This assumption, however, does not apply when
the statutory rights at stake are those of an individual
employee. Accordingly, the Board's refusal to decide ULP
issues that could have been submitted to arbitration, but were
not, is particularly inappropriate with respect to individual
rights cases.
Individual employees need access to the Board for the
protection of their statutory rights because those rights often
can be lost in the shuffle of clashing collective interests be-
tween union and employer. A union may have reasons for not
pressing a particular claim to arbitration that do not violate
its duty of fair representation under Vaca v. Sipes.29' For
example, it may legitimately make decisions favoring one
group of employees over another292 or decide that a given
claim is not a violation of the contract.293 Or the union may
decide that, although it would like to see the claim prevail,
some other case would be a better vehicle to establish a
desired construction of the contract. So, too, the costs of
arbitration may force the union to forego some meritorious
grievances and to select among them by a nondiscriminatory
means. 294  Such means may include the claim's importance
291. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). "[A] union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious
grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion," id. at 191, and it "must, in good
faith and in a nonarbitrary manner, make decisions as to the merits of particular
grievances," id. at 194.
292. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964).
293. Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658, 665-67 (6th Cir. 1961).
294. See, e.g., Giordano v. Local 804, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 634 F. Supp. 953,
957 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 678, 682 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
see also Croatian Fraternal Union, 232 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1016 (1977) (stating that a
union's financial inability to arbitrate does not warrant exception to the deferral
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to the bargaining unit or the employer's willingness to provide
partial but not complete relief required by the contract, or by
Board law. Indeed, even if the union goes to arbitration, it
may lawfully decide to litigate the grievance in a way that
protects the collective interest but is not the most effective
way to serve the interest of the individual grievant.29
Even if it is appropriate to require a union that wishes to
protect its interests vis-a-vis an employer to submit a claim to
an arbitrator first, it is unfair to impose that requirement on
an employee who cannot control the decisions whether to in-
voke arbitration or what arguments should be made in
arbitration. The practical effect of a deferral policy that
ignores this crucial distinction is that it substitutes the union
for the NLRB's General Counsel as the party who decides
whether individual employees' statutory rights will be en-
forced. Such a policy also substitutes the union's institutional
interest for the public interest as the basis on which such
enforcement decisions will be made.296
To guard against similar dangers, the Supreme Court has
held in a series of cases that individual statutory rights cannot
be sacrificed on the altar of arbitration. First, in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,297 the Court ruled that arbitration of
employee discrimination claims simply provided an alternate
means of enforcement which did not preclude the employee
from invoking statutory remedies under Title VII of the Civil
rules). The average cost of an arbitrator's services alone was more than $1500 in
1987. FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., FORTIETH ANN. REP.-FIscAL
YEAR 1987, at 21 (1987).
295. See, e.g., Harberson v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 977, 980-81 (10th Cir. 1987) (union
presented no evidence as to whether particular employees had been fired or
permanently replaced, in hopes that the arbitration would find both acts forbidden
and thereby benefit all union members).
296. Judge Gibbons argues that although the General Counsel has virtually
unreviewable discretion to initiate a ULP complaint, the Board is obligated to decide
cases once the General Counsel has prosecuted them. NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-
Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Therefore the
Board's deferral doctrine is an impermissible intrusion upon this prosecutorial
discretion. Id. at 387-88; cf. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union
Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 124-28 (1987) (stating that the statutory reference to the
General Counsel's authority to decide whether to press a ULP claim or, inter alia,
accept a settlement, does not authorize the Board to second-guess the General
Counsel's decision to accept a settlement). If, however, deferral occurred only at the
complaint-issuing stage, there would be no opportunity for Board review, and thus
no opportunity for judicial review of the standards for deferral or of the application
of those standards to particular cases. See id.
297. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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Rights Act of 1964.29 The Court extended the principle to
other federally protected rights in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc.299 and McDonald v. City of West
Branch.30  Although each of these cases involved employ-
ees who were permitted to pursue statutory claims after they
lost in arbitration, the grievance-arbitration procedure need
not be exhausted before the statutory proceeding may be
initiated.30 1
In McDonald, the Supreme Court elaborated the reasons
underlying this line of cases, which apply equally to claims
under the NLRA. The Court found that Congress intended
each cause of action to be enforceable by the federal
courts, 3 2 and as we have seen, Congress similarly made
clear its intention that the NLRA be enforced by the NLRB.
Indeed, in an NLRA case the argument against deferral is
even stronger than in Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and
McDonald because NLRA section 10(a), unlike the statutes
construed in those three cases, expressly refuses to permit
"any other means of adjustment" to affect this enforcement
power.3 °3
298. Id. at 49.
299. 450 U.S. 728, 737-41 (1981) (involving the Fair Labor Standards Act).
300. 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (involving the first amendment right to engage in
union activity enforced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564 (1987) (stating that the Railway Labor Act's policy
favoring arbitration of contractual disputes does not supersede cause of action under
the Federal Employers Liability Act).
301. See Harris v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 616 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1980);
Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 586 F.2d 90, 93 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 924 (1979); see also Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 738 n.12; cf. International Union
of Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1976) (stating that
the statutory period for filing a claim under Title VII does not toll during grievance-
arbitration period because the actions are independent).
302. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289.
303. Unlike those sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(4)(g) (1988), and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988),
that use the word "shall," section 10(a) provides that the Board is "empowered" to
prevent ULPs; it is not directed to prevent them. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988). Some
early cases focused on this distinction in suggesting that, in an appropriate case,
faced with an acceptable disposition under the procedures provided by a CBA, the
Board might choose not to take jurisdiction to decide whether there had been
unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d
262, 268 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693 (1941) ("[T]he mere fact that
a private right of an employee has been infringed by the act of an employer is not of
itself sufficient to bring the Board's powers into play."). Although the use of the term
"may" versus "shall" might affect the reviewability of an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, the reviewability of Board decisions is established by section 10(f) of the
Act, and the question is whether the Board has discretion to refuse to exercise
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At oral argument before the panel in Ham montree v.
NLRB, °4 the question was raised whether the recent string
of Supreme Court decisions applying the United States
Arbitration Act 30 5 (USAA), requiring arbitration of statutory
claims under both federal and state law, °6 are inconsistent
with the Barrentine line of cases, and whether they thus
support the deferral doctrine. 3 7  There are, however, two
reasons why these cases do not support the Board's current
position. First, the USAA expressly excludes employment
contracts,0 8 and although there was some early equivocation
on this point,0 9 it now seems clear that CBAs come within
this exclusionary clause.310 Second, the USAA cases all
jurisdiction on a ground that Congress has rejected. Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S.
184, 188-89 (1958) (stating that a Board order made in violation of express provision
of the Act may be struck down by a court). Surely the Board could not decide that
it will no longer hear any claims of violation of a particular subsection of section 8;
and in light of Congress's evident intent to bar deferral in the circumstances where
the ULP charge is not based on an alleged contract violation, a refusal to exercise
jurisdiction on that ground also is forbidden.
304. 894 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated en banc, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
305. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
306. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (state wage collection statute);
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (federal securities
laws); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(federal antitrust laws).
307. Interestingly, the question was raised by Judge Mikva, the author of the
majority opinion striking down the Board's deferral doctrine as applied in
Hammontree. See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 201-02
(4th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that the USAA cases undermine the Barrentine line of
cases, although those cases were ultimately distinguished because they involved a
CBA, not an individual contract), affd, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
308. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) ("[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment ... of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."). Although
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), involved the breach of a contract of employ-
ment, the arbitration provision was contained in a Uniform Application for Securities
Industry Registration Form, completed and executed in connection with the plaintiffs
application for employment, see id. at 485, and the Supreme Court did not discuss the
section 1 exclusion. The Court has since held that such a form is not considered to
be part of an employment contract and that the section 1 exclusion does not apply in
such circumstances. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2. Some cases suggest that this
clause of the USAA only applies to workers actually engaged in interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 n.4
(D.D.C. 1972) (finding that a stock brokerage account executive is not a "worker"
under section 1).
309. E.g., Local 205, United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co.,
233 F.2d 85, 98-100 (1st Cir. 1956), affd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
310. The cases are discussed persuasively in American Postal Workers Union v.
United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 470-73 (11th Cir. 1987).
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involve individual contracts.311 In such cases the individual
party to the litigation typically decides whether to enter the
contract in the first place (although it may well be a contract
of adhesion), and, if the dispute is arbitrated, both parties
participate equally in the selection of the arbitrator and
control the litigation of the case in arbitration. As one court
noted in distinguishing the Barrentine line of cases from an
age discrimination claim brought by a company manager, in
cases involving individual employment contracts, "concern
about the divergent interests of employee and union simply
does not exist."312
Supporters of deferral frequently seek to avoid the Barrentine
line of cases by quoting a passage in which the Barrentine
court distinguished between the right to a minimum wage
protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and "the
rights established through th[e] system of majority rule" which
are not protected for their own sake, but rather which "may
have to be subordinated to the collective interests of a majori-
ty of their co-workers."3 3 But this argument misstates what
"rights" the Supreme Court is comparing with the FLSA in
this passage because the rights set forth in the NLRA are not
established by a system of majority rule among employees;
they are established by an act of Congress. The "rights estab-
lished through a system of majority rule" to which the
Barrentine Court referred are the rights negotiated by the
union and incorporated into the CBA.314 Indeed, it is those
rights, and those rights only, which the system of industrial
311. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484-86 (1987); Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1985).
312. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 202 (4th Cir. 1990),
affd, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). The Court did not address the scope of the section 1
exclusion because, although it was briefed by an amicus curiae, the petitioner never
raised it and because the clause involved was not contained in an employment
contract. 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2. The Court noted:
In any event, it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion
because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract
of employment. The FAA requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be
in writing. The record before us does not show ... that Gilmer's employment
agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the
arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities registration application ....
Id. (citation omitted). Thus the Court held that the section 1 exclusion did not apply
to Gilmer's arbitration agreement. Id.
313. 450 U.S. at 735.
314. Id.
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arbitration is designed to enforce. 15 Thus, when the Court
cited authority for the importance of arbitration and of court
deference to arbitral awards, it mentioned no cases involving
the NLRA, but only cases that involved suits under the LMRA
to enforce CBAs.316 Thus, when an individual's discrimina-
tion or interference claim does not rest upon a construction of
the CBA, that claim should not be relegated to resolution by
the majoritarian forum of arbitration simply because the union
has agreed to use that forum for contract disputes.
Supporters of arbitration also have tried to distinguish the
Barrentine line of cases by arguing that the Barrentine Court
relied on the fact that the FLSA gives specific minimum
protections to individual workers "'[i]n contrast to the
[LMRA], which was designed to minimize strife and to
improve working conditions by encouraging employees to
promote their interests collectively.'" 317 The distinction does
not, however, bar the application of Barrentine's rationale to
individual rights cases under the NLRA, both because the
Court has not limited this line of cases to purely individual
rights, and because some of the rights provided by the NLRA
are individual, even if their purpose is to advance the collec-
tive weal.
First, although the FLSA scarcely promotes collective
activity, the Court also has extended Barrentine and Gardner-
Denver to areas of the law that protect collective as well as
individual action, such as the first amendment."' Political
315. See Delaney v. Union Carbide Corp., 749 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir. 1984).
316. 450 U.S. at 736. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 558
(1976) (employee enforcement of CBA against employer and duty of fair representa-
tion against union); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 372
(1974) (employer enforcement of CBA against union); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650, 651 (1965) (employee enforcement of CBA against employer); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (union
enforcement of contracts against employees); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577-78, 582-83 (1960) (same); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566, 568 (1960) (same); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (union enforcement 3f CBA against employee).
317. Sharpe, supra note 122, at 621 (quoting Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739
(emphasis in original)).
318. Although individual self-expression has long been considered one of the
values promoted by the first amendment, promoting democratic decision making and
achieving social stability while permitting change also are important. T. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15 (1966). Some argue that
individual fulfillment pales beside the promotion of political activity as a source of
the first amendment's importance and as a reason for its adoption. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971).
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speech, for example, is usually directed at persuading other
people to join with the speaker in achieving some common
objective, and the first amendment protects the right to join
an organization 319 (such as a union) as well as the right to
advocate common activity. Indeed, it was the exercise of
the first amendment right to engage in union activity that led
to McDonald's discharge by the City of West Branch,321' and
it was the exercise of the first amendment right not to join a
union that gave rise to the dues payment controversy with the
Chicago Teachers Union. 2 Yet the Supreme Court had no
difficulty in extending the rationale of Barrentine and
Gardner-Denver to such cases.323
Second, Congress designed the NLRA, like the LMRA, to
preserve industrial peace by encouraging collective action and
collective bargaining. 324 However, with the NLRA, unlike
the LMRA, this goal was achieved by conferring individual as
well as collective rights.325 It is evident, therefore, that
Congress concluded that protecting employees' individual
rights as well as collective rights was essential to achieving
the ultimate objectives of the Act. Indeed, Congress recog-
nized the problem of the union that acts, either as a pawn of
management or otherwise, against the interests of a minority
in the workforce." 6 The Wagner Act and its amendments
were tailored to ensure that the anti-discrimination provisions
319. E.g., Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463,
465 (1979); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
320. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
321. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 286 (1984).
322. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,301-02 (1986).
323. Another difference between the FLSA and the NLRA is that, although FLSA
rights are not waivable, Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740, many NLRA rights are.
Similarly, many constitutional rights may be waived, although careful scrutiny is
applied to ensure that the waiver is clear and knowing. See Metropolitan Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). For
a discussion of the application of waiver analysis to deferral doctrine, see infra notes
337-39 and accompanying text.
324. The NLRA, as modified by the Taft-Hartley Act, protects the right of each
employee both to engage in and to refrain from engaging in collective activity. See
79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2336; Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S.
95, 116 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
325. See General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810-13 (1977) (Murphy,
Chairman, concurring) (distinguishing between individuals' statutorily granted public
rights and the collectively bargained-for private rights of unions).
326. See 79 CONG. REC. 7569-70 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in
2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2333-34.
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of the Act continue to work even after a majority representa-
tive has been chosen327 to "make the worker a free man."328
Nor is there any reason to believe that the Board intends to
use its deferral doctrine as a means of substituting the law of
the agreement for the public law enforced by the Board during
the term of a contract, although the arguments in support of
deferral often allude to such a substitution of authority.329
The Court has asserted that the purpose of the Act is to
encourage collective bargaining and that collective bargaining
is supposed to advance the economic interests of all the
individual workers in the bargaining unit.33 ° Some commen-
tators have used this proposition as the basis for arguing that,
inasmuch as the majority of employees have supported the
union as their representative, it is entirely appropriate for the
system of collective bargaining to be permitted to handle
issues of individual rights.3 1  In effect, once the parties
enter the agreement they are governed solely by the contract,
and, with very few exceptions, the Board's law no longer
governs at all.332 Indeed, commentators postulate that this
formulation of the objectives of the deferral doctrine even
predicts the reasonable exceptions to the deferral doctrine, so
that, for example, charges raising matters that involve the
integrity of the system of majority rule, such as representation
questions, cannot be deferred to arbitration.333
The principal difficulty with the argument that bases
deferral on the desirability of allowing the parties to resolve
disputes through collective bargaining is that it goes too far.
If an arbitral decision about a contractual grievance were to
be treated as the equivalent of a negotiated settlement of a
Board charge, there would be no need to review the settlement
327. See S. REP. NO. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2312-13.
328. 79 CONG. REC. 7574 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY NLRA, supra note 235, at 2343.
329. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
330. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981).
331. See Sharpe, supra note 122, at 623.
332. See Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A
Possible Way Out of the Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23, 28
(1985) ("The parties' agreement, in essence, supplants the statute as the source of
many employee rights in the context of collective bargaining."); see also The
Arbitrator and the NLRB: Workshop Sessions: Workshop C, 20 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB.
PROC. 176-77 (1967) (remarks of Charles G. Bakaly).
333. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 332, at 30-32.
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documents either to determine that the ULP and contractual
issues were comparable, or to ensure that the substance of the
settlement was not repugnant to the purposes and policies of
the Act. Instead, review would only be for the purpose of
ensuring that the parties intended to resolve any possible
Board charges as well as the economic and contractual
disputes that were pending between them.
After all, that is how the Board reviews negotiated strike
settlements where no grievance procedure is invoked,334 and,
indeed, negotiated settlements of a grievance providing for
partial relief.335  In such cases, the Board asks simply
whether the parties agreed to include the statutory as well as
the contractual claim in their settlement.33 In making that
determination, the Board has traditionally applied the "clear
and unmistakable waiver" standard337 and allowed the union
to waive the employees' claims without their consent,338 but
it has not applied the Spielberg repugnance standard.339
Yet even the most stalwart defenders of the Board's current
deferral doctrine, who rely on the "private negotiation" argu-
ment for deferral, concede that it is only by carefully following
its standards for substantive postarbitral review that the
Board can vindicate its deferral policies and fend off the
334. See, e.g., Energy Coop. Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 635, 637 (1988).
335. E.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 501,502 (1979); cf. Alpha Beta Co.
273 N.L.R.B. 1546 (1985) discussed infra note 339.
336. See, e.g., Airport Parking Management v. NLRB, 720 F.2d 610, 615-17 (9th
Cir. 1983).
337. E.g., Energy Coop., 290 N.L.R.B. at 636-37.
338. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1987).
339. In Alpha Beta, the Board stated that the Collyer and Spielberg standards
applied to grievance settlements as well as arbitration awards. 273 N.L.R.B. at 1547.
But when the court addressed the issue of repugnance, it concluded the settlement
was not "palpably wrong" simply because the union had the authority to waive its
members' statutory rights during the settlement negotiations. Id. The Board thus
substituted the clear and unmistakable waiver standard for the more substantive
repugnance test. In a recent case, however, a divided Board panel applied the Olin
standard, rather than the "clear and unmistakable waiver" standard, in deciding to
defer to a grievance settlement in which the union withdrew the grievance, without
the grievant's consent, in return for a week's pay. See United States Postal Serv.,
300 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 5-7, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1209, 1210 (Sept. 28, 1990);
see also Catalytic, Inc., 301 N.L.R.B. No. 44, slip op. at 7-12, 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 113,
115-16 (Jan. 28, 1991).
If a settlement between the union and the employer is reached during the
pendency of the Board proceedings, the Board will give effect to the settlement only
where the ULP has been "substantially remedied," although, in assessing the degree
of remedy, the Board will take into account the usual risks of litigation. Independent
Stave Co., 287 N.L.R.B. 740, 752 (1987).
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charge that, by deferring, the Board is abdicating its statutory
responsibilities.34 ° In short, although there is undoubtedly
some truth to the perception that the grievance procedure is
a bargaining process, 341 the view of the arbitration process
as adjudication is so deeply embedded in Board law that def-
erence simply cannot be justified on the theory that the
outcome of an arbitration can be accepted as a negotiated
settlement.342
Proponents of deferral, in furtherance of private dispute
negotiation, argue that the union's duty of fair representation
(DFR),343  and its democratic obligations 344  under the
Landrum-Griffin Act,345 coupled with employee ratification
of CBAs, 346 adequately prevent union abuses in the handling
of employee disputes.34'  But the DFR provides protection
against only the most egregious violations of employee rights,
and employees have rarely been able to obtain substantial
relief in cases brought to enforce the DFR.3 4' The very
forgiving standards that most courts apply to union conduct in
DFR cases may be appropriate where the union has created
the contract rights that it has failed to enforce, but they
hardly seem appropriate with respect to the enforcement of
public legal rights created by the NLRA. If the union is going
to have a duty to prosecute Board law as well as its own
contract, perhaps it is appropriate to create an elevated
standard for union failings in that regard.349
340. See, e.g., Sharpe, supra note 122, at 643-44.
341. See generally J. KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT (1961).
342. See Communications Workers (C & P Tel.), 280 N.L.R.B. 78, 80-81 (1986)
(stating that because arbitration is an adjudication rather than a negotiation,
transcription of arbitration sessions is mandatory).
343. See Sharpe, supra note 122, at 645-48.
344. Id. at 614.
345. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
346. Sharpe, supra note 122, at 625.
347. Id.
348. See Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in Fact,
34 BUFFALO L. REV. 89, 157-58 (1985). Indeed, one senses that such commentators
as Professor Sharpe, who invoke the DFR as a protection against union abuses in the
grievance procedure, have little experience with the practicalities of DFR litigation.
349. If the union's DFR applies to Board charges-and surely it would if the union
grievance procedure became the primary means of enforcing the NLRA during the
term of a contract, see Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees Local 1263,
489 U.S. 527, 534 (1989) (discussing basing the DFR on the exclusivity of the union's
power to represent employee interests)-one also would face the question of whether
unions should share the employer's liability when they breach their DFR in the
handling of a ULP charge through the grievance procedure, as they do in connection
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Nor is deferral supportable on the theory that "the reality is
that individual employees ... vote on the ratification of
contractual provisions, including grievance-arbitration pro-
cedures [and so] the individual has a voice in selecting ... the
programs that will bind all members of the unit."350  The
"membership ratification" argument lends little support to the
Board's deferral doctrine for several reasons. First, although
many and perhaps most unions provide for membership
ratification, such procedures are by no means universal.351
Second, although in recent years courts have begun to develop
rules to govern the fairness of contract ratification votes,352
many contracts are still passed employing shockingly unfair
procedures which go unremedied either because the employees
do not find counsel or because the courts and the Board are
with their handling of contractual rights, cf. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459
U.S. 212, 226-27 (1983) (requiring the union to share in the employer's liability for
wrongful discharge when it breached its DFR by declining to take the grievance to
arbitration). However unfortunate it may be that unions have been saddled with a
share of the responsibility for lost wages and other damages caused by employer
breaches of the CBA in the traditional DFR context, see id. at 237-44 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), it seems particularly inappropriate to
make unions responsible for the financial harms caused by the Board's delegation of
its own ULP enforcement authority.
Litigators attempting to pursue this analysis would have to face the question of
how to subject the employer to liability once a union has been found to have violated
its DFR by failing to represent adequately an employee in an arbitration over NLRA
rights. The claim against the employer would seem to be a ULP claim that is within
the exclusive province of the Board. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236,244-45 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Local No. 776,346 U.S. 485,489-91
(1953). Yet the Supreme Court has cautioned against construing DFR law in such
a way as to encourage the presentation of the claims against employer and union in
two separate proceedings. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151, 164-65, 167-70 (1983). A possible solution, where the union's misconduct
consists of failing to press a ULP claim in arbitration, is suggested by a recent Second
Circuit decision: a court might invoke the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988), to
bring the employer into the DFR suits against the union where it is necessary to
provide complete relief. See United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
No. 91-6096, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25524, 1991 WL 222298 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1991)
(allowing a district court to enjoin an employer for violating the NLRA right of access
of nonemployee union candidates in a union election ordered by consent decree
between the federal government and the union because it is consistent with the spirit
behind Garmon).
350. Sharpe, supra note 122, at 625.
351. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 78 (1970).
352. See, e.g., Bauman v. Presser, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2393, 2399-401
(D.D.C. 1984) (finding that by being provided with only limited notice and information
on a contract proposal, the membership was denied a meaningful right to vote). I
have been deeply involved in this area both as a litigator and a commentator. See
Levy, Membership Rights, supra note 11.
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unreceptive to their complaints. 53  Indeed, the Board re-
cently stated that a union may violate its duty to bargain
under section 8(b)(3) by refusing to sign a CBA because of the
lack of a proper membership ratification, where a union leader
mistakenly tells the company that the CBA was properly
approved but was later overruled by intraunion authorities.354
Third, contracts are voted up or down in their entirety355 so
members do not have a chance to vote on the grievance-
arbitration procedures themselves, nor are they able to vote
those procedures down because the procedures might be
construed to be a substitute for the right to file a ULP charge.
Indeed, as I will discuss in more detail shortly, it is the rare
agreement that contains an express waiver of the right to seek
relief from the Board.
Related to the proposition that Board deferral policy
furthers private settlements is the argument, most closely
associated with an article by Circuit Judge Harry Edwards,
that deferral should be accepted on the theory that the union
implicitly waives the statutory rights of the employees it
represents by agreeing to an arbitration clause.356 Judge
Edwards has advanced that argument to support the propriety
of deferral of unilateral change claims under section
8(a)(5)." 7 He also argues, on a similar rationale, that defer-
ral may be defended as it is applied to discrimination and
interference claims. 35 '8 But, at least as applied to individual
353. E.g., Kozera v. Westchester-Fairfield Chapter of Nat'l Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, Inc., 909 F.2d 48, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding a CBA addendum that was
never approved by the membership).
354. Teamsters Local 251 (McLaughlin & Moran), 299 N.L.R.B. No. 7, slip op. at
8-10, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1217, 1218-19 (July 13, 1990); see also Kozera, 909 F.2d at
54; Levy, Membership Rights, supra note 11, at 260-63.
355. See Davey v. Fitzsimmons, 413 F. Supp 670, 677-78 (D.D.C. 1976).
356. Edwards, supra note 332, at 28; see also Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d
1486, 1502-04 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J. concurring). This argument, like the
deferral-as-negotiation argument, also might be said to go too far, in that, if
employees' statutory rights have been waived, there is no need to review the arbitral
determination for repugnance to the Act. One might avoid this difficulty by
supposing that the right to have the Board review arbitration decisions for
repugnance is not waived, but the very squirming that is required to address this
problem shows how very hypothetical is the "waiver" on which the argument is based,
and thus how far removed it is from the "clear and unmistakable" waiver that is
required under settled Board law.
357. Edwards, supra note 332, at 34-35.
358. Id. at 28-30. Professor Harper has argued that waiver doctrine provides the
limiting principle for the Board's authority to defer, i.e., that the Board may not defer
in any case where the asserted ULP cannot be waived by the union in collective
bargaining, whereas it may (but need not) defer in cases where the asserted union
Deferral and the Dissident
546 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
rights claims, Judge Edwards's argument founders on the rule
that a waiver of employee rights may not be found unless it is
"established clearly and unmistakably."359
There are two kinds of rights whose waiver might support
the doctrine of deferral. First, the agreement might be said to
waive the parties' right to have the Board consider ULP
charges. Yet there are few cases in which the parties to a
CBA intend the grievance procedure to supplant the Board's
role in the adjudication of ULP claims. The parties may well
bargain for arbitral construction and application of their
contract without necessarily bargaining for arbitral construc-
tion or application of the NLRA. Indeed, applying this
analysis to particular cases would require inspecting the
agreement and the bargaining history of the contract. It
seems unlikely that one could find a "clear and unmistakable"
agreement by the union to foreswear resorting to the Board
during the life of the contract. Moreover, the Board tradition-
ally has been quite wary of employer interference with the
rights of employees or unions seeking the Board's protec-
tion,36° and employer insistence on such a waiver would
likely be treated as bad faith bargaining.36 1 Accordingly, a
hypothetical waiver of the right to resort to the Board hardly
seems useful as a basis for a doctrine that the Board applies
on such a regular basis as deferral to arbitration.
The other possible basis for finding a waiver that supports
deferral is that the union may have waived substantive
employee rights, such as the right not to be subjected to
discrimination or interference, that are at issue in the ULP
proceedings in which deferral is invoked. The principal
difficulty here is that CBAs normally do not waive employees'
statutory rights other than the right to strike; their principal
could waive the underlying right. Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under
the NLRA: Part II, A Fresh Approach to Board Deferral to Arbitration, 4 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 680, 691-703 (1981). Although Professor Harper regarded this analysis as
severely limiting the Board's deferral authority, id. at 704, his list of nondeferrable
rights, Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part 1, 4 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 335, 342-61 (1981), seems overly optimistic.
359. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1983).
360. Thus, employees may not be disciplined for filing Board charges, NLRB v.
Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 423-25, 428
(1968), and charges implicating denial of access to the Board have always been
exempted from deferral. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
361. See Consumers Asphalt & Concrete Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 77, slip op. at 7-10,
132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1392, 1395-96 (June 15, 1989) (stating that an employer may not
condition agreement to a CBA on union willingness to drop ULP charges).
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function is to expand employee rights beyond those which they
would have without a contract.362 Moreover, the Board has
specifically rejected the proposition that, simply by agreeing
to arbitrate a discharge, the union waives the underlying
rights that are to be adjudicated in the discharge.363 Again,
although such a waiver is theoretically possible, it seems to be
an exceptionally tenuous basis on which to build a deferral
doctrine that the Board hopes to be able to invoke whenever
a ULP charge is filed during the term of a CBA.
Judge Edwards proposes another way in which waiver
analysis may be applied to support the deferral doctrine. He
suggests that the Board should routinely conclude that
because an arbitrator's decision "becomes a part of the written
contract," that contract, as newly construed, constitutes a
waiver of any applicable statutory rights.364 Judge Edwards
reaches this conclusion by relying upon footnote thirteen of
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,36 where the Court stated
that an arbitral construction of the contract "may be relevant
to establishing waiver of [a] statutory right when the arbitra-
tor has stated that the bargaining agreement itself clearly and
unmistakably imposes an explicit duty on union officials."366
From this proposition Judge Edwards reasons that it may be
enough to find a waiver if the arbitrator gives an "explicit
construction of the contract," subject only to extremely def-
erential review under the Steelworkers Trilogy367 standard
to decide whether the decision draws its essence from the
agreement.368
The error here is that mere interpretation of the contract,
whether by an arbitrator, by the Board, or by a court, does not
establish that a waiver was "clear and unmistakable." Judge
Edwards's analysis reduces the clear and unmistakable waiver
standard to a mere formality and substitutes for it the
362. See Sharpe, supra note 122, at 629.
363. See Barton Brands, 298 N.L.R.B. No. 139, slip op. at 13,135 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1022, 1026 (June 29, 1990); see also Northside Elec. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 34, 35 n.1
(1965) (distinguishing deferral from the parties' efforts to bargain away statutory
rights).
364. Edwards, supra note 332, at 38.
365. Id. (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 709 n.13 (1983)).
366. 460 U.S. at 709 n.13.
367. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
368. Edwards, supra note 332, at 38-39.
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Steelworkers Trilogy standard which almost always requires
that the arbitrator be upheld. After all, (at least theoretically)
arbitrators always purport to construe the contract, and thus
could always be said to have found a contractual waiver. This
would have made it unnecessary for the Court in Metropolitan
Edison to describe a limited set of circumstances in which
arbitral decisions "may be relevant" to establish a waiver;
instead, arbitral decisions would always effect a waiver.
Therefore, the waiver basis for deferral is inconsistent with
governing precedent and should not be adopted.369
Another argument in favor of deferral that may, at least in
some contexts, be more forceful than the "bargaining" and
"waiver" theories, is one that concedes that arbitration may be
substituted for the Board's own enforcement processes only
insofar as the quality of the adjudication that the arbitration
provides is comparable to the quality that the charging party
would receive in a Board proceeding. Professor Sharpe
argues that the quality of arbitration has improved sufficiently
such that, coupled with careful postarbitral review under the
Spielberg standards as augmented in Raytheon, some arbitra-
tions may fairly be treated as surrogates for litigation before
the Board.37 °
Professor Sharpe asserts that most arbitrators have law
degrees371 and that counsel also often represent the griev-
ants in many arbitrations.372 Moreover, the proceedings are
conducted with increasing formality that "approaches the
formality of a Board proceeding";37 3 for example, both in-
clude well-defined burdens of proof, subpoenas that are
enforceable by the courts or through Board proceedings under
369. Board law also is contrary to Judge Edwards's analysis. In Barton Brands,
298 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1022 (June 29, 1990), an arbitration
decision overturned the discharge of O'Daniel but conditioned his reinstatement on
his refraining from holding union office for the next three years. Slip op. at 3, 135
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1022-23. When O'Daniel subsequently was elected union
president and then discharged, the employer argued, inter alia, that the arbitral
decision waived his right to hold union office. Id. at 4-5, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1023.
The Board disagreed, holding that although the arbitral decision depriving O'Daniel
of his statutory rights followed from the union's agreement to arbitrate the original
discharge, it did not meet the standards required to find waiver of an employee's
statutory right (assuming arguendo that the right could be waived, a dubious
assumption in my view). Id. at 13, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1026.
370. Sharpe, supra note 122, at 625-27.
371. Id. at 626.
372. Id. at 627.
373. Id.
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section 8(a)(5), and the like.374 Because these proceedings
are coupled with Board review to ensure that the statutory
and contractual issues are "properly coextensive, the arbitrator
need concentrate only on resolving the contractual issues
fairly. This is precisely the extent of the arbitrator's authority
and responsibility under the contract."375
One might take that argument a step further by pointing
out that even under Barrentine and Gardner-Denver, courts
are not precluded from giving weight to an arbitral award in
deciding a subsequent statutory proceeding. Rather, the
weight accorded to arbitral awards depends on such factors as
the degree to which the statutory and contractual issues are
in conformity, procedural fairness in the arbitral forum,
adequacy of the record on the statutory issue, and the special
competence of the particular arbitrator. 6 Indeed, the Court
went so far as to say that "[w]here an arbitral determination
gives full consideration to an employee's [statutory] rights, a
court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially
true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed
by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an
adequate record." 377 Why could one not argue that, if strictly
applied to ensure that the arbitrator did truly apply contrac-
tual standards that are coextensive with the requirements of
the statute, the Board's deferral doctrine amounts to a
glorified version of giving "great weight" in appropriate
circumstances to an arbitral determination? Additionally, one
might contend that giving such weight is appropriate where,
borrowing a distinction from the pre-Spielberg decision in
374. Id.
375. Id. at 626-27. Sharpe also argues that "the community of arbitrators is
aware of the special statutory implications of arbitral decisions," implying that
arbitrators can be expected to apply the standards of Board law. Id. at 626. This
argument is less forceful, both because cases continue to occur in which arbitrators
choose not to apply Board doctrine, e.g., Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404 (D.C. Cir.
1986), and because an arbitrator who goes beyond the terms of the contract to apply
Board law will have his award vacated because it does not draw its essence from the
contract. Indeed, in Roadmaster Corp. v. Production & Maintenance Employees'
Local 504, 851 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1988), the court overturned an award that had been
based on the NLRA, despite the arbitrator's reference to Collyer as condoning arbitral
consideration of the statute in making decisions. Id. at 889. The court noted that
Collyer was decided before Gardner-Denver, and concluded: "Resolution of NLRA
disputes must be left to the NLRB and not to an arbitrator." Id. at 889 & n.3.
376. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 n.22 (1981)
(quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974)).
377. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974)).
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Wertheimer Stores,37 the employee voluntarily submits the
statutory claim to arbitration rather than insisting on a
hearing before the Board.379
This assertion is the most troubling of all the arguments
that are advanced to support the doctrine of deferral to
arbitration. Nevertheless, though there may well be many
arbitral determinations that are worthy of substantial respect
in deciding ULP cases, many others are not. Furthermore, as
discussed above, there is substantial reason to doubt that the
Board's post-Olin decisions do, in fact, apply sufficient
scrutiny to arbitral proceedings and awards to ensure that the
ULP issues receive sufficient consideration, according to
standards comparable to those that the Board would apply,
and to warrant giving the arbitral decisions "great weight"
that is tantamount to a collateral estoppel effect.3 ' There
is also reason to question whether, by adding to the formality
of the arbitration process to ensure that arbitral determina-
tions gain respect in subsequent Board or court proceedings,
the parties are not depriving themselves of one of the greatest
advantages of arbitration: its informality and lack of ex-
pense. 38 ' But, if the Board continues the trend that some
recent decisions suggest and closely scrutinizes arbitrations to
be certain that the contractual and statutory issues are indeed
the same, that the union did in fact forcefully argue the
surrogate issue and obtain and present the relevant facts, and
that the arbitrator did in fact apply Board standards, it may
be able to return to a defensible deferral doctrine. The Board
378. 107 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1954).
379. Id. at 1435. Such a partial or contingent election of remedies must be
distinguished from the involuntary character of an employee's submission to arbitra-
tion only because she is compelled to do so by the Board's prearbitral deferral
doctrine. Nor should an employee be considered to have elected to allow an
arbitrator to resolve ULP claims simply because, at the urging of a union steward
and without careful consideration or advice from an independent counsel or a Board
agent, she files a grievance within the two- or five-day limitations period allowed by
most CBAs, and then is swept along to arbitration while Board proceedings are
stayed pursuant to the rule set forth in Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431, 433
(1963), supplemented, 148 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1964), enforced on other grounds, 353 F.2d
157 (6th Cir. 1965).
380. See supra Part II.D; see also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,
480-85 (1982) (holding that due process permits res judicata and collateral estoppel
to be applied only to issues and claims that the claimant has previously had a "full
and fair opportunity to litigate").
381. See Sharpe, supra note 122, at 627 (stating that informality is being lost);
FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERV., supra note 294, at 21 (showing the
increased cost of arbitrators' services).
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may do so without expressly overruling Olin Corp., but rather
failing to follow it in its original, extreme form.
IV. APPLICATION OF DEFERRAL DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE TEAMSTER JOINT COMMITTEE
Having teased out the strongest arguments in support of the
Board's deferral policy, and having sought to separate the
valid ones from those that do not stand up to examination,382
I now consider whether these valid arguments can support
deferral to the Teamster joint committees. To accomplish this,
first I examine the actual operation of the Teamster joint
committee and compare that procedure with normal union
grievance and arbitration procedure. Then I address the
question of whether the rationale for deferral can properly be
applied to the joint committees in light of the crucial differ-
ences between the two means of resolving contract dis-
putes. 8 3 In fact, as this analysis reveals, a joint committee
decision rejecting an employee's claim is no more, and no less,
than a decision by a Teamster member's own leadership to
abandon his grievance at an early stage in the grievance
process, short of the type of arbitration contemplated by the
deferral doctrine.8 4 Moreover, even to the extent that such
committee decisions are regarded as adjudications, the quality
of the adjudicatory process is so low that deferral is not
warranted.
382. As I have indicated, however, I have grave doubts about whether even these
arguments can justify deferral in the individual rights case where the charging
party's claim does not depend on a construction of the CBA.
383. At this juncture I would like to acknowledge the pioneering scholarship of
Professor Clyde Summers whose article on the subject of Teamster joint committees,
Teamster Joint Grievance Committees: Grievance Disposal Without Adjudication, 37
ANN. NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. PRoc. 130 (W. Gershenfeld ed. 1985), breathed new life
into the legal attack on the equivalence between joint committees and more
traditional forms of arbitration that many courts had been content to presume.
384. See generally Comment, The Teamster Joint Grievance Committee and NLRB
Deferral Policy: A Failure to Protect the Individual Employee's Statutory Rights, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1473-79 (1985) (authored by Gregory E. Zimmerman) (arguing
that problems with the Teamster system in the area of individual rights support
separate deferral standards).
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A. Operation of the Teamster Joint Committee Contrasted
with the Regular Union Grievance and
Arbitration Procedure
In most unions, a worker who believes that her rights under
the CBA have been violated consults a union representative
who advises her whether she has a viable claim under the
agreement."' In some contracts, the very filing of a griev-
ance form requires the approval of a union representative,
such as a steward or a business agent;. 6 in others, the
member may file a grievance on her own.3"7 In either case,
the union then assumes responsibility for discussing the
grievance with the employer who may grant or deny the relief
requested. If the grievance is denied, then a union representa-
tive with greater authority decides whether to take up the
grievance with higher management representatives who again
have the capability of denying, granting, or reaching a compro-
mise on the grievance."' The grievance proceeds through
this process until, finally, the grievance is discussed at the
highest levels available under the grievance procedure (for
example, between the local union president or grievance
committee and the plant manager, or, in a multiplant company
with a national contract, between the representatives of an
international union and the corporation's national labor
relations staff).38 9
At each "step" of the grievance procedure, both the union
and the company have the power under the contract to concur
in the position of the other.39 ° The company could decide to
grant the grievance, the union could decide to abandon the
grievance, or the two sides could settle the grievance through
compromise. If the parties reach an agreement, the decision
becomes final and binding under the contract and cannot be
385. H. ERICKSON, THE STEWARD'S ROLE IN THE UNION 30-31 (1971). Stewards
often will spot violations themselves and will encourage members to file grievances.
Id. at 29-30; R. SCHWARTZ, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF UNION STEWARDS 38 (1988).
386. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 25, at 121, 128 (1973).
387. Id. at 120.
388. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193-94 (1967); Feller, A General Theory
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 743, 753 (1973).
389. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 25, at 113; Feller, supra note 388,
at 752-53.
390. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 25, at 120-23.
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set aside unless it is determined in a "hybrid" DFR action 391
that the union has breached its DFR by declining to seek any
relief, by accepting less than complete relief, or by not taking
the grievance to the next higher step (or to arbitration).392
But if the two sides find themselves in disagreement at any
step, and neither side is willing to yield, the grievance
proceeds to the next step of the procedure, until ultimately the
union invokes impartial arbitration.393
The same sort of process takes place under the Teamsters'
national contracts, but the succession of meetings to consider
grievances and to decide whether and how to settle them are
described by the parties as "joint grievance committees." 394
So, for example, under the Carolina Supplement to the
National Master Freight Agreement, the first meeting will be
between representatives of the local union and the employer
at the local level.395 If these representatives cannot settle
the grievance, because neither side is willing to compromise or
abandon its position, the grievance is next considered by a
joint committee for the states of North and South Caroli-
na.396 This committee consists of an equal number of union
and employer representatives, 3 9 7 who may "settle" a griev-
ance by majority vote. 39' Assuming the parties do not settle
391. The "hybrid" case consists of two closely related lawsuits: one against the
union for breaching its DFR, and one against the employer for violating the CBA.
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983). In
DelCostello, the Court did not reach the question of whether there was a violation of
the CBA unless there was a breach of the DFR. Some people assert that there can
be no recovery against the union absent a violation of the CBA. Id. at 165. But that
statement is too strong, because the union may be sued under the DFR even if no
contract breach is at issue such as when the union is alleged to have unfairly
negotiated a contract, or denied hiring hall referrals. See, e.g., Breininger v. Sheet
Metal Workers, 493 U.S. 67, 75-84 (1989). Some parties also argue that, even in a
hybrid case, a union may be held liable for damages notwithstanding the ultimate
conclusion that the employer did not violate the CBA. See White v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
392. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166 n.16.
393. E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175 & n.3 (1967).
394. See Summers, supra note 383, at 133-35.
395. CAROLINA FREIGHT COUNCIL OVER-THE-ROAD SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
(Apr. 1, 1985-Mar. 31, 1988) art. 44, § 1 [hereinafter CAROLINA SUPPLEMENT]. Other
supplements to the freight agreement have different article numbers, but their
content of comparable clauses is virtually the same nationwide. See, e.g., SOUTHERN
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 25, art. 43, § 2.
396. CAROLINA SUPPLEMENT, supra note 395, art. 43, § 1.
397. Id.
398. Id. art. 44, § 1.
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at this level, the grievance may then proceed to the Eastern
Conference Joint Area Committee,399 and then to the Nation-
al Grievance Committee.4 °° If the joint committees deadlock
all the way to the top of the grievance procedure, the parties
are entitled to use economic self-help (i.e., a strike or lockout)
to win the grievance.40 '
Each committee consists of an equal number of union and
employer representatives, with no neutrals or tie break-
ers.40 2  A majority vote is required in order to "decide" a
grievance. Therefore, whenever an employee's grievance is
"granted" by a joint committee, one or more of the company
representatives must have voted to sustain the union's
position; similarly, when a committee "denies" a grievance, one
or more union representatives voted to sustain the employer
conduct which precipitated the grievance. As Professor David
Feller has observed, "A decision by a joint committee that a
grievance lacks merit.., is thus simply an agreement by the
union that management did not violate the agreement."
40 3
The joint committee procedure also differs from the tradi-
tional union procedure in that, under some Teamster agree-
ments such as the National Master Freight Agreement, there
is no mandatory arbitration at the end of the process. Rather,
if there is a deadlock at the National Grievance Committee,
each side is entitled to economic self-help, or the parties may
refer the grievance to an impartial arbitrator.4 4 But arbi-
tration, too, must be done by majority vote4 5 and thus
cannot be accomplished without the consent of both sides.
Joint committees under other Teamster contracts have a
similar pattern of pyramiding joint committees to which
399. Id.
400. Id. art. 43, § 7.
401. See Miller, Teamster Joint Committees: The Legal Equivalent ofArbitration,
37 ANN. NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. PROC., supra note 383, at 121.
402. See generally NMFA, supra note 25, art. 8; CAROLINA SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 395, arts. 43, 44.
403. Feller, supra note 388, at 837; see also Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,352
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (characterizing the decision of the Teamster joint
committee as tantamount to a "mutually acceptable grievance settlement between an
employer and a union"). Such a decision does not, of course, necessarily mean that
the employer has not violated the Act, nor does it constitute a waiver of statutory
rights that may be analogous to the contractual rights that are at issue in the
grievance.
404. NMFA, supra note 25, art. 8, § 1.
405. Id.
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grievances may be referred in the event of deadlock,4 °6
culminating in the right to use economic self-help, with one
very significant exception. Under the United Parcel Service
agreement, which covers the second largest Teamster bargain-
ing unit, the parties do not have the option of economic
recourse once the grievance procedure has been exhausted;
rather, either party may invoke binding arbitration.4 °7
Thus, the similarities between the roles of the multiple steps
of other unions' grievance procedures and the Teamster's joint
committee procedure as precursors to binding arbitration are
shown most clearly in the case of the UPS agreement.
There is another reason why the assumption that grievance
committees are simply another form of arbitration is seriously
misplaced. The joint committee system was originally formed
by Farrell Dobbs, an early Teamster leader in the trucking
industry, because he distrusted arbitrators based on his view
that their interests would inevitably be aligned with capital
and against the working class. 40 ' Rather than giving the
right to decide the meaning of contracts (and thus, poten-
tially, to eviscerate their protections) to arbitrators, the union
preferred to be able to wield the strike threat to maintain the
contractual benefits that it had won at the bargaining
table.40 9 Jimmy Hoffa expanded the joint committee system
to the entire trucking industry, although more for manipula-
tive than ideological reasons. As the Professors James showed
in their detailed study of Hoffa's leadership, he used the joint
committees not only to keep contractual application out of the
hands of arbitrators, but also to maximize the leverage that he
could bring to bear on operators, local union officials, or
insurgents who contested his control.410 It is not surprising,
406. See Miller, supra note 401, at 118 (discussing many different joint committee
arrangements under different Teamster agreements); Azoff, Joint Committees as an
Alternative Form of Arbitration Under the NLRA, 47 TUL. L. REV. 325,326-29 (1973).
407. See Barr v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 868 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting
that arbitration is the final step in the UPS grievance process); Thomas v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F.2d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing how, if a vote by the
UPS committee were split along partisan lines, the case would go to arbitration).
408. See R. JAMES & E. JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS 168 (1965); Summers,
supra note 383, at 130.
409. R. JAMES & E. JAMES, supra note 408, at 167-68.
410. Id. at 171-174; see id. at 31-33, 135, 167-70, 175-85, 202. Control over the
grievance procedure translates into control over the leaders of subordinate bodies for
the simple reason that a local leader would recognize that he cannot serve his
constituents by winning grievances (and thus cannot expect to be reelected) unless
he has the support of the members of the Teamster hierarchy who appoint the union
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in light of the James' candid reports of their observations, that
they are the last outsiders who have been permitted to sit in
on joint committee hearings.411
Another major difference between grievance procedures that
conclude with arbitration and the joint committee process is
that Teamster officials do not exercise the screening function
that officials of other unions do in deciding which cases should
be taken to the joint committee.412 If every grievance culmi-
nated in a hearing before an arbitrator, the parties would be
swamped in arbitrations. Thus, in Vaca v. Sipes,413 the
Court indicated that one of the reasons why it would impose
liability on union officials only if they arbitrarily failed to take
a case or processed it in a perfunctory manner, was that a
stricter standard would encourage unions to arbitrate
meritless grievances.414
In the Teamsters union, however, this sifting does not occur
among union officials before arbitration, but rather during the
deliberations of the joint committees in which union officials
participate along with their coequals representing the employ-
ers. Although elected local union officials may attempt to
representatives who sit on the grievance committees. See PROFESSIONAL DRIVERS
COUNCIL, INC., TEAMSTER DEMOCRACY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 27 n.80 (1976);
Summers, supra note 383, at 142-43. For evidence that Teamster employers
recognize and welcome the significance of the joint committees for intraunion politics,
see infra note 451.
411. Elliot Azoff and Gerry Miller gathered their (favorable) impressions of the
joint committee from their work as Teamster lawyers. Professor Summers, by
contrast, was forced to obtain material for his critical study by interviewing unionists
and lawyers and reviewing court decisions and whatever documents his sources had
obtained in discovery or otherwise. Summers, supra note 383, at 133.
Insiders, in turn, often fear retaliation from the powers that be in the union if they
come forward with descriptions of misconduct in the joint committee process. For
example, in Zimmers v. Preston Trucking Co., 90 Cv. 70091-DT (E.D. Mich.), the
lawyer for a dissident union candidate was able to secure an affidavit from a local
union official who served as a sergeant-at-arms for a particular joint committee
hearing. In the affidavit, the official recounted how, both at a union "screening"
session before the hearing, see infra notes 427-28 and accompanying text, and during
the executive session following the hearing, an officer of the grievant's local, who was
not assigned to hear the case, advocated the discharge of the grievant and was
reported to have threatened the union members of the panel. Affidavit of Gary E.
Proctor at 1-2. The affiant averred that he was afraid of retaliation if he testified to
what he had seen. Id. This case was settled based on this explosive affidavit, but the
affiant's union hall was burned down shortly thereafter. See Affidavit of Barbara
Harvey at 7, United States v. Teamsters (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 88 Civ-4486) (Sept. 30,
1991).
412. See Azoff, supra note 406, at 365.
413. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
414. Id. at 191-92.
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persuade a grievant to accept a compromise, absent the
consent of the grievant, practically every grievance is submit-
ted to a joint committee. Then, grievances with little or no
merit are compromised or abandoned by the union officials
who sit on the joint committees;415 some meritorious griev-
ances, particularly those filed by union insurgents, also may
be summarily dropped.416 And the harder and more impor-
tant cases are passed up the union hierarchy to the regional
and national committees.
Joint committees are able to do the sifting that most other
unions do before arbitration because the committees use very
different procedures from those used in true arbitration. In
arbitration, the two sides normally present witnesses 417 and
documents,414 and cross-examine each other's witnesses.
419
According to the most recent data from the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, the average labor arbitration hearing
lasts one day, and on average the arbitrator spends another
two days studying the briefs and preparing a decision.42 ' By
contrast, a panel of the joint committee typically hears
between fifteen and thirty grievances in a single day,421 with
each grievance consisting of brief oral presentations by local
union and company officials, along with the submission of
some documents and perhaps written statements by witnesses,
but usually there is no "testimony."422 The joint committee
decides the cases in executive session on the day that they are
heard, and immediate rulings are issued without any explana-
tion beyond "denied," "granted," or "deadlocked." 423 On aver-
age, a panel spends fifteen minutes hearing from the two sides
and five minutes deciding the grievance.424
Yet another differenc between arbitration and the joint
committee process is displayed in their attitudes toward ex
415. Cf. Miller, supra note 401, at 124-25 & n.13 (defending the joint committee
process by analogizing the decision process of staff member of postal union to drop
grievance to the sifting process that occurs within joint committees).
416. See Summers, supra note 383, at 142.
417. 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 195, at 151.
418. Id. at 224-26.
419. Id. at 159 (asserting that cross-examination is "essential to a fair hearing").
420. FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., supra note 294, at 21.
421. Summers, supra note 383, at 134.
422. Miller, supra note 401, at 119.
423. Summers, supra note 383, at 134.
424. Id.; see also Jeffers v. Convoy Co., 636 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (D. Minn. 1986)
(showing that the Wisconsin Joint Auto Transport Committee heard 11 cases in a
single day).
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parte communications. The rules of arbitration strictly forbid
ex parte contacts between the parties and the arbitrators,425
but such contacts between interested union and employer
officials and their counterparts on the joint committees are not
only proper, but the "expected norm."4 26  Indeed, before the
joint committees meet, the two sides commonly conduct their
own screening sessions among both the advocates and the joint
committee members on that side.4 2' Each side uses such
sessions to discuss the cases that are about to be heard,
determine which cases are the most important, and consider
the best way to present the important cases to persuade the
other side to concur in a particular settlement of those
grievances.4 28
Arbitration and the joint committee system differ in still
another way. Although an arbitrator adjudicates each individ-
ual case on its own merits, the joint committees resolve
grievances by the job lot and necessarily become involved in
disposing of grievances that are deemed less important to
425. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION RULE 45,
reprinted in COULSON, LABOR ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 86 (rev. 3d
ed. 1986).
426. See, e.g., Azoff, supra note 406, at 360-61. In one DFR case, Pendleton v.
UPS, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2680 (W.D. Tenn. 1981), affd without opinion, 709 F.2d
1506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983), the employee plaintiff introduced
evidence of this practice and argued that the breach of the DFR occurred when his
union representatives failed to take advantage of the opportunity to undertake ex
parte communications. Id. at 2682. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that
a union scarcely has the duty to act improperly on behalf of its members. Id.
Although ex parte communications might seem improper ifjoint committees are seen
as a form of adjudication, they are not improper if the committees are viewed, more
accurately, as a political process. This case is a prime example of the courts' effort
to squeeze the joint committees into a pigeonhole where they do not belong, instead
of taking a step back, considering them as political bodies, and then inquiring
whether standard legal doctrines that govern other unions' grievance procedures may
properly be applied in this context.
427. Summers, supra note 383, at 138-39; see also Affidavit of Gary E. Proctor at
1, Zimmers v. Preston Trucking Co., No. 90 Cv. 70091-DT (E.D. Mich.) (Apr. 26, 1990)
(referring to union screening).
428. Summers, supra note 383, at 138-39. Indeed, the local union officials who
act as "advocates" in one case will sit as members of the joint committee in other
cases during the same two or three day session of the joint committee, thus heighten-
ing the political atmosphere of the process and making the horsetrading of grievances
inevitable. Id. at 141. See also Affidavit of Martin W. Linskey I 12, quoted in Olsen
v. United Parcel Serv., 892 F.2d 1290, 1297 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Everything is predeter-
mined between the Union and management."); Deposition of Chuck Mack at 11-12,
Voloshen v. McLean Trucking Co., No. C83-0761 (N.D. Cal.) (May 21, 1984)
(discussing how prescreening meetings are used to hammer out the union's position
on discharge grievances).
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obtain concessions on the more important grievances. 9
Both sides know that, if they rigidly refuse to vote for the
other side on every grievance, every case would be deadlocked
and there would be a dramatic increase in the potential for
strikes. Thus, the parties have a strong incentive to engage
in the trading of grievances. Elliot Azoff, a Teamster lawyer
who defends the joint committee system as a means of
resolving labor disputes, argues that "the joint committee is
structured so as to insure maximization and exploitation of
opportunities for wheeling and dealing."43 °  Azoff believes
that, although these problems occur with all union processes,
"[t]he difficulties . .. are accentuated in the committee sys-
tem." 431
Azoff nonetheless praises the committees for their ability, in
effect, to amend the CBA to carry out the wishes of the parties
in resolving a particular collective-bargaining dispute, regard-
less of what the parties may have intended when the contract
was originally negotiated: "While an arbitrator would be
bound to apply the existing contract, no similar limitation
would restrict the actions of the joint committee that could
modify, amend or supplement the original agreement
....,,432 Teamster contracts commonly do have a clause
forbidding the modification or alteration of the CBA in the
course of resolving a grievance. However, they apply that
restriction only to the decisions of impartial arbitrators when
they are called in the event of a deadlock; the limitation does
not apply to the decisions of the joint committees.433 Justice
Goldberg recognized this difference in his concurring opinion
in Humphrey v. Moore,434 where he distinguished the powers
429. Summers, supra note 383, at 140-41. In his defense of the joint committee
process, Teamster lawyer Miller relies primarily on the absence of any "reported
case" sustaining this contention, Miller, supra note 401, at 124, ignoring the fact that
the inability of outsiders to gain access to the grievance committees' deliberations
makes such proofs difficult, to say the least, in any fair representation case. The
admission by Elliot Azoff, another defender of the process, that horsetrading is one
of the purposes of the joint committee, see Azoff, supra note 406, at 328-29, coupled
with the observations of neutral parties, the Professors James, see R. JAMES &
E. JAMES, supra note 408, at 182, should be a sufficient basis for predicating a legal
standard to govern the treatment ofjoint committee decisions on the proposition that
grievance committees trade grievances.
430. Azoff, supra note 406, at 328-29.
431. Id. at 330.
432. Id. at 348; see also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
433. E.g., CAROLINA SUPPLEMENT, supra note 395, art. 44, § 1.
434. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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of an arbitrator under most labor contracts from the power of
the union and the employer, operating through the mechanism
of the joint committee, to amend the contract if it suits their
needs.43 5
To recognize the difference between joint committees and
arbitration is not to deny Teamster employers the ability to
agree with their unions that joint committees should be the
mechanism for achieving final and binding resolution adjust-
ment of grievance disputes between them, just as the resolu-
tion of a grievance through the grievance and arbitration
procedure is final and binding. 43 But it does allow us to
proceed to the final stage of our argument here: whether the
joint committee system, given its peculiarities, is well suited
to meet the objectives that the Board's deferral policy is
designed to serve.
B. Deferral Doctrine Should Not Be Applied to
Teamster Joint Committees
The first and most fundamental point is that a decision by
a Teamster joint committee to drop a grievance is comparable
to a union's decision to drop a grievance short of arbitration.
The Board's Spielberg doctrine provides for deferral to arbitra-
tion, and the Collyer doctrine provides for deferral to grievance
procedures that culminate in an arbitration award that can
satisfy the Spielberg criteria (as modified in Olin). On the
435. Id. at 353 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
436. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 351 (1964) (binding on employees);
General Drivers, Local Union No. 89 v. Riss & Co., Inc., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963)
(binding on union and employer). Nor does recognition of the difference necessarily
bear on the standard that should be applied to decide whether there has been a
breach of the DFR. In that regard, a joint committee's decision to drop or compromise
a grievance is as "final and binding" as the results of another union's grievance
procedure. It should be recognized, however, that a joint committee decision to deny
a grievance necessarily represents the union's decision to drop that grievance, similar
to another union's decision not to arbitrate. Dropping or compromising grievances
is not inherently unlawful; compromise is, after all, the essence of negotiation. But
I would argue that the decision of the union, acting through the joint committee, to
drop the grievance should be examined through the prism of the DFR, rather than
by focusing exclusively on the performance of the union "advocate" before the
grievance committee. Otherwise, the ability of the union to mask its rejection of the
grievance behind a joint committee, whose reasons are never given, effectively places
the Court's "bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct," Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
182 (1967), out of the reach of most Teamsters.
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other hand, the Board has not held that it is appropriate to
defer to a union's decision to drop a grievance,43 v or a union's
decision to settle a grievance short of arbitration (at least
where the employee has objected to the settlement).438 In
light of the similarity between a Teamster joint committee
decision to reject a grievance and a decision by other unions
to drop a grievance short of arbitration, the Board has every
reason to refuse to defer to the joint committee.
The principal argument against this contention seems to be
that the parties to contracts in the trucking industry have
agreed on the joint committee system as a way of reaching
final and binding decisions about grievances. Therefore, the
Board should be as bound to respect the outcome of that deci-
sion making method as it is bound to respect the outcome of
arbitration. 439 This argument misses the point. The parties
to most other CBAs have agreed that, when the union drops
or settles a grievance short of arbitration, for any of a number
of reasons, that resolution is final and binding under the
agreement.44 ° Yet the Board has refused to defer to that
prearbitral resolution by treating it as tantamount to a
decision on the merits of the ULP claim.441 In other words,
the argument based on the parties' choice of grievance proce-
dures would apply equally to Teamster committees and most
other unions' decisions. Thus, that argument goes too far.
Perhaps in a further rebuttal, one could argue that all I
have really done is offer a persuasive argument for the Board
to reconsider its refusal to defer to a union's decision to
withdraw a grievance. But the alternative of extending
deferral doctrine generally, rather than paring it back in the
437. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. But one should note the case of
United States Postal Serv., 300 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1209 (Sept. 28,
1990), where the Board applied Olin standards to a union's express settlement of a
grievance that the Board held amounted to a waiver of the employee's underlying
statutory rights. Slip op. at 7, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1211. If that decision stands,
and is held to apply even where the union did not expressly extend the waiver to
statutory rights, however, my argument here would be severely undercut in the case
of joint committee decisions that awarded partial relief to the grievant. Because
Postal Service does not apply where the union simply withdraws the grievance, my
argument here would continue to be fully applicable to the far more common instance
in which the joint committee simply denies a grievance.
439. This is the argument that the Board found persuasive in Denver-Chicago
Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416, 1421 (1961).
440. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
441. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
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joint committee context, seems unattractive given the other
objectives of deferral. When the Board defers to an
arbitrator's resolution of a contractual grievance, it is assured
that a neutral party, after hearing testimony and considering
the arguments of the parties, has reached a reasoned decision
about a contractual issue and has based the result solely on an
analysis of the contractual issue. In theory, by comparing the
contractual issue with the statutory issue, the Board can then
ascertain whether the hearing before the neutral party is a
rough substitute for the hearing that would be obtained before
the Board. Admittedly, the equivalence will not be exact;
presumably the Board hearing would be more thorough and
more legalistic, and the Board agent, an experienced trial
attorney, would no doubt provide more professional represen-
tation than a union business agent. But the similarities will
be sufficient to permit the Board to presume that the arbitral
determination should be accepted as a fair resolution of the
Board charge, unless something suggests that the hearing was
particularly unfair or that the reasons given by the arbitrator
for ruling against the grievance are inconsistent with Board
law.
To be sure, particular arbitration proceedings may lack one
or another characteristic of the model I have just described,
and one could argue that the Board should properly defer to
those arbitrations notwithstanding the absence of that charac-
teristic. But the joint committee, like a prearbitral step of the
grievance procedure, lacks so many of the attributes of an
arbitral hearing that the Board would not be warranted in
applying a comparable presumption of regularity to its
outcomes.
Three important differences between joint committees and
arbitral hearings justify differential treatment. First, joint
committees lack the characteristics of a trial. They lack
documents, testimony, and cross-examination.442 The com-
mittee also takes and decides cases very quickly, spending a
few minutes on each case and deciding up to thirty or more in
a day.443 Such circumstances hardly ensure that the disput-
ed facts have been fairly determined.
Second, the joint committee does not explain the reasons
underlying its decisions.444 When an arbitrator rules, the
Board can look to the reasons in his decision to determine
442. See supra notes 421-23 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 421, 424 and accompanying text.
444. See supra note 423 and accompanying text.
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whether the decision may be at odds with the principles of the
Act. The Board simply cannot make that determination with
respect to a joint committee decision, especially because under
Olin, the burden rests with the General Counsel to show
defects in the award,445 and because the doctrine of arbitral
immunity may forbid the Board from asking the members of
the joint committee to explain their decision after the fact. 446
Moreover, the discipline of having to provide an explanation
for the decision has some impact in confining the arbitrator to
legitimate rather than illegitimate considerations. That force,
however, is lacking in the case of either the joint committee or
the prearbitral steps of the grievance procedure.447
One response to this argument might be that jury decisions
similarly contain no guarantee of reliability, and yet the courts
have never hesitated to give them collateral estoppel effect in
other cases raising common factual issues.448  But in those
cases, courts can look to the jury instructions and the record
of evidence presented at trial to determine whether the jury's
verdict should be given preclusive effect. Similarly, some
people argue that the Board can examine the contract and the
arguments presented by the parties, as reflected in the tape
recording of the hearing.
That argument brings me to the third and final important
difference between the two forums: the lack of assurance that
the joint committee (or a similar prearbitral step of the
grievance procedure) has followed the contract or confined its
deliberations to the matters of record. These assurances are
445. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 575 (1984).
446. See Lewis v. NLRB, 779 F.2d 12, 13 (6th Cir. 1985). Even if such testimony
were admissible, an after-the-fact explanation advanced for the sole purpose of
protecting the company against liability, and after the panel member has been
apprised of the member's theory of liability under the NLRA, would be far less
reliable than a contemporaneous explanation. Such an explanation also would lack
reliability because the panel member could explain only why the particular case was
decided the way it was, but not why the decision was consistent with the other 30
decisions of the same date which would, of course, have been decided without any
explanation.
447. Because joint committees do not give reasons for their decisions, it also
cannot be determined whether, in resolving the grievance, the union representatives
on the panel considered the statutory rights at issue and "clearly and unmistakably"
chose to waive them. Thus, even if the joint committee decision is treated as a
negotiated settlement rather than as an adjudication, it cannot be treated as a waiver
of the relevant statutory rights that warrants application of a doctrine comparable
to deferral. Cf. supra notes 329-42 and accompanying text.
448. See, e.g., Stangle v. Chicago, Rock Is. & P.R.R., 295 F.2d 789, 791 (7th Cir.
1961).
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absent for several reasons. First, ex parte discussions between
the parties and their representatives on the joint committee
are part of the normal operation of the process. 49 Second,
unlike a jury whose composition is established by a procedure
that screens out the most prominent cases of suspected
partiality, the joint committee, like the participants in the
prearbitral steps of the grievance procedure, consists of
representatives of the two sides who are, if anything, screened
to ensure vigilance in representing the institutional interests
of their side. 5° Indeed, evidence suggests that the highly
political nature of the joint committees and their significance
for defeating union reformers in intraunion struggles is both
known to and welcomed by management.4 51  And third,
unlike the jury, which is at least theoretically bound to follow
the law as presented by the instructions, Teamster joint
committees are not bound to follow the contract; they are free
to modify, alter, or disregard it if they consider it appropriate
to do so in the interests of their respective sides in a particu-
lar case.452
For all of these reasons, the Board should not apply a pre-
sumption of regularity to assume that a joint grievance
committee's decision is based on the contract or on the overt
arguments of the parties. At best, the Board can review a
transcription of a tape recording of the parties' presentations,
and determine whether the contractual issues appear to have
449. See supra notes 425-28 and accompanying text.
450. See Chicago Cartage Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 710, 659
F.2d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1981). The union-side members of the grievance committees
are selected, directly or indirectly, by the ranking union officials for the relevant
jurisdiction. See Deposition of George Rohrer at 14-18, Torbet v. Delta Cal. Indus.,
No. C-84-0632 TEH (N.D. Cal.) (June 14, 1984). Thus, for example, when dissident
candidates are elected to local union posts, they do not thereby accede to the joint
committee appointments that their incumbent predecessors held.
451. See supra notes 426-31 and accompanying text. For example, a UPS manage-
ment document, used as a training manual for managers who present cases to the
joint committees, explains the use of joint committees rather than the more
traditional forms of arbitration by stating that they permit management to "[d]evelop
a relationship with union officials. Slow down dissidents!" United Parcel Serv., Labor
Relations Workshop Handout at 5 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
452. This freedom distinguishes the joint committees even from the meetings at
the prearbitral steps of the grievance procedure, at which it would be theoretically
inappropriate for the parties to decide on a resolution of a dispute in complete
disregard of the actual requirements of the contract.
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been put before the joint committee;453 it cannot be sure
precisely how the committee members evaluated these presen-
tations or, indeed, what role, if any, they played in the final
outcome. Consequently, even if the contractual and statutory
issues are closely congruent and even if the presentation
before the joint committee closely resembles the presentation
before the Board, the Board cannot assume that the joint
committee has resolved the grievance in a way that is roughly
consistent with the proper manner for resolving the ULP
issue.
One final objection might be raised to my thesis: that the
joint committee process has been accepted as the equivalent of
arbitration far too long to reopen the debate now. True, the
Supreme Court has expressly held that the outcome of a joint
committee hearing is just as final and binding as the outcome
of another union's arbitration procedure.454 And there have
been a number of other decisions in which the Court has
simply assumed, normally because the parties made no
argument to the contrary, that a joint committee decision is an
arbitration. 5 So, too, the Board expressly held in 1961, in
Denver-Chicago Trucking,456 that grievance committee deci-
sions would be considered equivalent to arbitration awards for
the purposes of applying Spielberg. Since then, the Board has
cited Denver-Chicago in numerous cases,457 assuming its
453. Sometimes these presentations permit the Board to determine that the
statutory issues were not adequately considered, see, e.g., Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 1252, 1255 (1988), enforced en banc, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir.
1991), but the opposite is not true: the Board cannot be sure that the statutory
issues were in fact considered. The reason that one can be sure in some circum-
stances that the statutory issues have not been considered is that, if those issues do
not appear in the transcript, the Board at least knows that one of the parties to the
ULP proceeding has the wherewithal to produce evidence of such consideration: the
employer who appoints representatives to the joint committee. If the evidence were
available, the Board could be confident that it would be produced. But the charging
party, particularly a union dissident, does not have access to information to
contradict the appearance created by a hearing transcript. The Board cannot assume
from the fact that the transcript shows some reference to an issue that is parallel to
the ULP issue that all possible evidence bearing on whether that issue was in fact
considered has been produced for the ULP hearing.
454. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 351 (1964) (binding employees);
General Drivers, Local Union No. 89 v. Riss & Co., Inc., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963)
(binding union and employer).
455. E.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155
(1983); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 58 (1981); Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 557 (1976).
456. 132 N.L.R.B. 1416, 1418-21 (1961).
457. See 1 SHEPARD'S FEDERAL LABOR LAw CITATOR (pt. 1), 879 (1987 ed.).
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correctness but never actually considering whether it was
correctly decided. There are, I think, some reasons to believe
that the time is right to reopen the question.
The first reason is that, because of the various scholarly
studies that have been conducted since 196 1,458 and because
of the facts that have come to light, piece by piece, in the
course of discovery in DFR cases and Board litigation, we
know a great deal more about the joint committee process
than the Supreme Court or the Board knew in the early 1960s,
and much of that new data is unfavorable to the joint commit-
tee process.459
Second, deferral doctrine has evolved substantially since
1961. In light of the development of detailed common law
rules to decide when deferral is and is not appropriate,46 °
and in light of the elaborate rationales offered in defense of
deferral, 46 1 one can compare this new learning about joint
committees with the new understanding of deferral and its
basis and ask anew whether the decision-making procedure
fits the doctrine.
A third reason for reopening the question is that courts are
finally becoming willing to ask hard questions about joint
committee decisions, after years in which lawyers representing
Teamster dissidents kept "beating their heads against a brick
wall" asking courts to look past the label to the reality of joint
committee decisions.462 This has become apparent in some
of the cases in which courts of appeals have reviewed Board
deferral decisions.463 It has even begun to crop up in DFR
cases. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has now held that
Teamster members of joint committees owe a DFR to the
458. E.g., R. JAMES & E. JAMES, supra note 408; Azoff, supra note 406; Summers,
supra note 383.
459. See Part IV.A.
460. See supra Part II.
461. E.g., Sharpe, supra note 122. As a seasoned litigator against the Board, I
would like to take credit for some of the rationales offered in defense of deferral.
462. During the dry years, lawyers arguing against joint committee decisions had
to be content with occasional questions from the bench about the differences between
joint committees and arbitration. See, e.g., Transcript at 6, United Parcel Serv., Inc.
v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981) (No. 80-169); Transcript at 25, Clayton v. United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 451 U.S. 679 (1981) (No. 80-5049).
The lone voice protesting the inadequacies of joint committees belonged to Eighth
Circuit Judge Gerald Heaney. See Irvin H. Whitehouse & Sons Co. v. Local Union
214, Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades, 621 F.2d 294, 299 (8th Cir. 1980).
463. Hammontree v. NLRB, 894 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990), rev'd en banc, 925 F.2d
1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986).
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employees whose grievances are being heard,464 and two
federal district courts have held that union representatives on
a joint grievance committee could breach the DFR by improp-
erly modifying an agreement, rather than simply interpreting
it. 465 In one state law case, a federal district court held that
although arbitration awards may be given collateral estoppel
effect, the joint committee proceeding in that case did not
provide "a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question at
hand," and so did not merit the application of collateral
estoppel. 6
I do not want to be understood as suggesting that the courts
will ultimately hold that joint committee decisions are not
entitled to final and binding effect with respect to the parties'
rights under the CBA, comparable to arbitration decisions.
The Supreme Court has squarely held that joint committee
decisions are to have such an effect.467 These holdings are
likely to stand; in my judgment, they are correct as a matter
of law and should stand. Thus, the parties who create
contractual rights, as the union and employer do by negotiat-
ing a CBA, are entitled to decide that they would rather have
a quick and dirty way of deciding how those rights ought to be
applied (or ignored), even at the expense of increasing the risk
of error in finding the correct facts and decreasing fairness to
the employees.
On the other hand, the parties are not entitled to insist that
their quick and dirty way of resolving questions about contrac-
tual rights that they have created should also be given binding
or even presumptive effect in decisions about the application
of rights created by Congress to advance the public interest.
Even assuming that such effect is properly given to the
464. E.g., Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., 890 F.2d 909, 923 (7th Cir. 1989). That
court held, consistent with its view of the duty of fair representation in other
contexts, that the duty is not breached absent intentional discrimination against a
member. Id. at 922-23.
465. Walker v. Teamsters Local 71, 714 F. Supp. 178, 191 (W.D.N.C. 1989), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 930 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60
U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Sept. 18, 1991) (No. 91-491); Warner v. McLean Trucking Co.,
574 F. Supp. 291 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
466. Jeffers v. Convoy Co., 636 F. Supp. 1337, 1339-40 (D. Minn. 1986). But cf.
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-85 (1982) (stating that due
process creates a comparable standard that must be met before arbitration
proceeding may be given collateral estoppel effect).
467. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 351 (1964); General Drivers, Local
Union No. 89 v. Riss & Co., Inc., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963).
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decisions of arbitrators, deference is something to be earned by
a decision-making procedure, not to be claimed as a matter of
right.
It might be argued that, by refusing to defer to joint commit-
tee decisions because of their differences from full-fledged
hearings before neutral arbitrators, the Board would make it
impossible for Teamster-UPS joint committees to function as
they have in the past. Similar arguments are made each time
workers seek legal guarantees of fairness from their employers
and unions, yet the Supreme Court has consistently rejected
this argument.468 Such speculative warnings deserve no
more credence here.
But even if Teamster-UPS joint committees could not
function as in the past, the resulting changes in the joint
committee process would be desirable ones. The perception of
unfairness caused by the peculiarities of the system has
helped make Teamster joint committees responsible for 56%
of all postarbitration hybrid DFR suits, and has made the
Teamsters union responsible for nearly one-third of all DFR
cases-percentages wholly out of proportion to the 9% of the
unionized workforce represented by the Teamsters union.469
No process that is producing this much litigation can be
working fairly and effectively.
The Teamsters and some employers evidently find the joint
committee process convenient, and they undoubtedly have
their reasons for wanting to continue it. Some of those
reasons may be legitimate, but a union desire to hide political
retribution under a patina of arbitral respectability is not a
legitimate reason for joint committees. If the joint committee
process cannot survive the creation of an effective remedy for
union reformers' grievances that are rejected because of the
political animus of union officials on those committees, and if
joint committees have saddled the courts with numerous DFR
468. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,54-55 (1974); see also
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-92 (1967).
469. Goldberg, supra note 348, at 122-24, 128-29. The figures, if anything, are too
low. The 56% figure is derived by multiplying the fraction of postarbitration cases
involving the Teamsters (66.2%) by the fraction of such cases that involved the joint
committee (84.9%). Id. But because less than half of all Teamster contracts provide
for joint grievance committees, the disproportionate contribution of the Teamster
joint committee process to the judicial burden created by DFR suits is even more
striking.
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suits even without such a remedy, then the process simply
does not deserve to survive.
Given that deference to joint committees has a negative
impact on the prospects for union reform because it allows
dissidents to be picked off and chilled in the exercise of their
statutory rights, and given the reasons to believe that joint
committees' decisions do not deserve the same respect as the
decisions of neutral arbitrators, the Board would do well to
discard its blind deference to joint committee decisions.

